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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Affirming the trial court's decision would effectively eliminate the statute of frauds as it applies to leases and overrule a
number of Utah cases.

Furthermore, the doctrine of promissory

estoppel would be modified by significantly minimizing the requirement of reasonable reliance and substantially expanding damages
available

for promissory estoppel claims.

Affirming

the trial

court's decision would allow anyone who is unable ultimately to
consummate a contract to sue the other party after negotiations fail
and claim he relied upon the hope of a contract.

The impact on

commercial transactions in Utah would be far reaching since the
trial court's ruling effectively eviscerates the statute of frauds,
the

solemnity

of

written

contracts,

and

the

requirements

of

contractual offer and acceptance.
Even given Stangl's version of the facts, the material facts
remain the same.

Stangl told Ernst he owned the property and never

corrected that misconception; he never told Ernst he was buying the
property; he never signed any documents with Ernst; and he voluntarily held the property for 2 1/2 years after negotiations ended.
Those facts are insufficient to overcome the statute of frauds and
to create promissory estoppel with damages representing 2 1/2 years'
worth of consequential damages.

ARGUMENT
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS SHOULD NOT BE ELIMINATED IN
THE AREA OF AGREEMENTS TO LEASE REAL PROPERTY.
Agreements to lease real property for more than one year or an
agreement to lease an interest in land must be in writing to be
enforceable.

See, Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-5-3 and 25-5-4(1).

An oral

agreement to make a contract is also within the statute of frauds.
SCM Land Co. v. Watkins & Faber. 732 P.2d 105 (Utah 1986).

Applying

these basic principles, the trial court properly found

there could

be

of

no

contractual

recovery

because

of

the

statute

frauds.

Nevertheless, it applied promissory estoppel to avoid the statute of
frauds.1

Stangl tries to ignore the fact that upholding this deci-

sion would overrule at least three Utah Supreme Court decisions:
McKinnon v. The Corp. of the Pres. of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter Day Saints, 529 P.2d 434
4 Utah 2d 386, 295 P.2d 332

(Utah 1974), Easton v. Wycoff.

(Utah 1956), and Ravarino v. Price,

123 Utah 559, 260 P.2d 570 (Utah 1953).

Stangl claims these old

*Stangl argues for the first time on appeal that there were two
promissory estoppel claims, one for breach of contract and one
"that did not depend on the existence of a binding contract."
(Brief of Appellee, p. 22, n.ll). Neither the Complaint nor the
Trial Briefs, nor even the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
ever suggested there were two separate promissory estoppel causes
of action.
Furthermore, the trial court's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and Decision states that the "promise" was the
August 2, 1988 telephone call that led Stangl to believe a lease
would be completed. Stangl claims Ernst promised it would lease
the property and failed to do so, thus damaging him. Trying to
divide the claim or create an imaginary "second" promissory
estoppel claim is useless; the lawsuit still boils down to a claim
that Ernst failed to lease the property.
Therefore, it is an
alleged "promise" governed by the statute of frauds.
-2-

cases involved a narrower form of promissory estoppel and urges this
Court to ignore Utah Supreme Court precedent and rely instead on the
decision in a federal district court case, Medesco v. LNS Int'l.
762 F. Supp. 920 (D. Utah 1991).
Stangl implicitly acknowledges that this Court would effectively be overruling Utah Supreme Court precedent by upholding the
decision below.

The court in Ravarino squarely held that an oral

agreement to convey two tracts of land could not be enforced by the
use of promissory estoppel:
[W]e conclude the general rule applies that an estoppel
will not arise simply because of a breach of a promise as
to future conduct or because of a disappointment of expectations on an executory agreement.
Ravarino, 260 P.2d at 577.
The court in Easton specifically held:
The mere refusal to execute a written contract as agreed
does not constitute "fraud" within the rule that the
Statute of Frauds will not be enforced where the effect
would be to perpetrate a fraud and to hold otherwise would,
in effect, completely nullify the Statute of Frauds.
Easton, 295 P.2d at 333.
Finally, in McKinnon, the court held:
However, a mere promise to execute a written contract and
a subsequent refusal to do so is insufficient to create an
estoppel, although reliance is placed on such a promise and
damage is sustained as a consequence of the refusal.
McKinnon, 529 P.2d at 436-437.
The trial court's holding that Stangl could use promissory
estoppel to obtain damages from Ernst for an alleged promise to

-3-

execute a lease directly contradicts McKinnon. Easton, and Ravarino.
Pursuant to SCM Land Co. . supra. that alleged promise falls within
the Utah statute of frauds.

Just as stated in these cases, it was an

alleged "promise to execute a written contract" or "disappointment of
expectations on an executory agreement."
Recognizing his dilemma, Stangl claims that McKinnon, Easton.
and Ravarino involved a different type of promissory estoppel theory.
Nonetheless, he cannot escape the fact that the statute of frauds
would be nullified by the trial court's holding because one party
could always claim there was an oral promise and sue.

Stangl's

argument that different promissory estoppel law should apply would
only

be

relevant

if

this

case

presented

promissory estoppel could actually be used.

a

circumstance

where

Expansion of the theory

of promissory estoppel is irrelevant to whether the statute of frauds
will be ignored.
as

it applies

Until the legislature changes the statute of frauds
to leases or the Utah Supreme

Court overrules a

substantial body of law consisting of McKinnon. Ravarino. Easton. and
others, expansion of the doctrine of promissory

estoppel

cannot

nullify Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-5-3 and 25-5-4(1).
Stangl also attempts to sidestep these cases by claiming he is
only asking for damages as a consequence of the promise and not for
enforcement of the lease itself.

This new proposition contradicts

Stangl's theory at trial and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law he drafted, specifically Conclusion of Law No. 10, which says:
-4-

"Injustice can only be avoided in this case by enforcing Ernst's
promise to lease the anchor space under promissory estoppel." This
new request for relief also ignores the Utah cases holding there must
be a requirement of a writing for subject matter covered by the
statute of frauds.
entitles

him

to

Stangl claims that a mere "agreement to agree"

damages. The

Utah

Supreme

Court

rejected

such

contentions in Engineering Ass'n.. Inc. v. Irving Place Ass'n.. Inc..
622 P.2d 784 (Utah 1980) and in Harmen v. Greenwood. 596 P.2d 636
(Utah 1979) .2 In none of these Utah cases were damages allowed,
regardless of whether the requested relief was specific performance
or consequential damages.

As the McKinnon court stated:

A mere promise to execute a written contract and subsequent
refusal to do so is insufficient to create an estoppel
although reliance is placed on such a promise and damage is
sustained as a consequence of the refusal.3

2

These cases involved signed letters where there was absolutely
no dispute as to the "alleged promise." By contrast, in the present
case the parties never signed any letter of intent; the alleged
promise consists of a telephone message left with a receptionist
stating the project had been approved and a letter of intent would
be forthcoming.
(See. Finding of Fact No. 26.)
3

Stangl also tries to claim that McKinnon may impliedly allow
promissory estoppel to be used in a statute of frauds case by
emphasizing an excerpt from this case. (Brief of Appellee, p. 23,
n.12.) Importantly, the court in McKinnon goes on to state that
"the promise as to future conduct constituted an intended abandonment of an existing right of the promisor." Nothing could be
further from the truth in this case given that all the letters of
intent exchanged (although never signed) provided any obligation
would be subject to a signed lease agreement executed by the
parties. Nor is there any Finding of Fact or Conclusion of Law
that Ernst "intended abandonment of an existing right." Thus,
promissory estoppel to circumvent the statute of frauds is
fruitless here.
-5-

Stangl is ultimately reduced to claiming that Medesco is better
reasoned and that this Court should somehow overrule Utah Supreme
Court precedent.

Medesco was decided on a summary judgment motion;

therefore, we do not have the benefit of the rather narrow formulation of Restatement (Second) of Contracts. § 139, as it applied to
actual facts after a trial such as in this case. It is hard to
believe damages would be awarded after the parties exchanged letters
of intent, which neither party signed; lease negotiations continued
with multiple versions exchanged; and, ultimately, lease negotiations
broke off.

Unlike the plaintiff in Medesco. Stangl secretly bought

a piece of property, after advising Ernst that he already owned it,
and was awarded damages for 2 1/2 years.
decision would

allow

frustrated

Upholding the trial court's

negotiators

to claim

promissory

estoppel and seek damages for money spent in "anticipation" of a
possible

contract,

even

expenditures at the time.

if

the

other

side

was

unaware

of

the

Stangl's use of Medesco is suspect, given

the summary judgment context of Medesco compared to the trial and
result in this case.

This is not the case for trumping the statute

of frauds and adopting Restatement (Second) of Contracts. § 139.4

4

For reasons stated in Ernst's Opening Brief, other courts have
refused to adopt § 13 9 in the face of specific statutory enactments
such as Utah Code Ann. §§ 25-5-3 and 25-5-4(1) even though courts
adopted the expanded version of Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
§ 90.
-6-

Although courts in other jurisdictions have created limited
exceptions to allow promissory estoppel recovery despite the statute
of frauds, none of those exceptions supports the decision in this
case.

Stangl is not claiming that there should be a limited excep-

tion, but argues to this court that it must completely adopt § 139
and overrule the earlier Utah cases.

Presumably, this is because

Stangl recognizes that none of the exceptions from other jurisdictions will help him.
A.

Alleged Promises Made in Contract Negotiations Cannot Revive
a Rejected Offer.

Stangl tries linguistic legerdemain to claim on appeal he really
had two promissory estoppel cases to avoid the statute of frauds and
also tries to claim that promissory estoppel can now be used in Utah
in contract negotiations.

To do so would require this Court to

overrule R.J. Daum Constr. Co. v. Child, 122 Utah 194, 247 P.2d 817
(Utah 1952) .

Stangl tries to distinguish Daum by claiming it was a

construction case and therefore should not apply.

The Utah Supreme

Court in Daum specifically stated:
We know of no case where an offeror has been held to be
bound by estoppel without an acceptance of his offer.
Daum, at 208.
The Daum decision makes sense. When parties are negotiating but
ultimately do not reach an agreement, one party should not be allowed
to revive the negotiations and claim that damages were sustained as
a result of promissory estoppel applied to contract negotiations.
-7-

In the unpublished decision of Triax Pacific Inc. v. American
Ins. Co•. No. 94-8091, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 31097 (10th Cir., Nov. 2,
1995) (copy attached as Appendix A ) , the court held that any promises
made were part of preliminary contract negotiations and could not
form the basis for promissory estoppel.

The court found the defen-

dants would not reasonably expect any action or forbearance until a
written contract was consummated.5

In the present case, all letters

of intent exchanged contained a provision that there was no binding
agreement between the parties until a lease had been executed by all
parties.

The letters of intent sent by Stangl said this also.

The

written record of the correspondence reinforces the expectation set
by the law that there is no obligation until a ''written contract is
consummated."
The uncontroverted

facts in this case and admitted exhibits

prove negotiations were ongoing; Stangl is trying to enforce an
alleged promise supposedly made in the midst of negotiations.
cannot avoid the facts as shown by the documents.

Stangl

A more complete

recital is set forth in Ernst's Opening Brief, but a summary follows:
June 3, 1988 - Stangl's agent, Pruitt, sends a letter
stating that Stangl was interested in leasing space in the
plaza to Ernst.

5

Although the Triax Pacific Inc. decision is not precedent,
pursuant to the court's General Order found at 151 FRD 470
(Appendix B ) , it may be cited where it would assist a court in its
disposition.
-8-

June 23, 1988 - Stangl's agent sends Ernst a letter setting
forth the general terms of a lease and asking Ernst to
sign. It was not signed.
June 29, 1988
disagreement.

- Ernst

responds,

identifying

areas

of

July 8, 1988 - Ernst sends a letter of intent asking that
it be signed but conditioning the letter of intent upon
execution of a lease agreement.
July 14, 1988 - Stangl counters with his own offer to lease
including the same language about lease approval and asks
Ernst to sign it. It was left unsigned.
August 2, 1988 - Ernst calls Stangl's agent and leaves a
message saying that the project was approved and another
offer to lease would be forthcoming.
August 5, 1988 - Stangl sends Ernst's form lease with
substantial changes.
August 23, 1988 - Ernst sends back a revised lease to
Stangl.
August 29, 1988 - Stangl sends back a letter and draft
lease with over 44 changes. The marked up lease includes
changes on almost every page.
September 12, 1988 - Ernst sends Stangl a letter saying the
negotiations
will
terminate
absent
resolution
of
significant remaining issues.
September 14, 1988 - The parties hold a meeting after which
at least five open issues were left unresolved.
Even Stangl must agree with the above recital because it is all
documented.

The letters, the leases, and his notations on documents

are clear.6

6

Stangl tries to escape the consequences of not having accepted
an offer and not having agreed to the terms by claiming that he
would have ultimately accepted and the five remaining issues were
not very important to him. Nonetheless, he expressly acknowledges
that there were five open issues and therefore no agreement. The
trial court also found this in denying the contract claim. (See,
Court's Memorandum of Decision dated April 20, 1993).
-9-

Stangl claims, and the trial court apparently found, that the
August 2, 1988 telephone message that the project was approved and
another offer to lease would be forthcoming, constituted a "promise."
The uncontroverted chronology of lease negotiations shows that at
least twice thereafter, Stangl rejected Ernst's offers and counteroffered attempting to get a better deal.
Promissory estoppel was never meant to apply to this type of
situation. The trial court's decision, if affirmed, would expose
every contract negotiator in Utah to a claim for promissory estoppel
when any negotiations terminate.

The cases cited by Stangl and

recent Utah cases applying promissory estoppel such as Andreason v.
Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 848 P.2d 171 (Utah App. 1993) address
promissory estoppel outside of the contract arena.

This is particu-

larly the case where the alleged promises are subsequently rejected
by the party trying to enforce the promise at trial.

Promissory

estoppel simply cannot be used to displace contractual concepts of
offer and acceptance.
From a public policy standpoint, there are good reasons for
this.

When parties are negotiating before entering a written docu-

ment, by definition there is no agreement yet. In essence, every
offer and counteroffer

could be retroactively

converted

into an

enforceable promise regardless of the statute of frauds or contract
principles of offer and acceptance.
assume

that

they

will

have

no

When people negotiate, they

liability

-10-

until

they

reach

an

agreement.
new

Affirming the trial court's decision would create a whole

dimension

of

claims unbounded

by

any

requirements

normally

expected by reasonable people.
B.

Promissory
Reliance.

Estoppel

Cannot

Be

Found

Without

Reasonable

Stangl claims he proved the necessary elements of promissory
estoppel and reasonably relied by purchasing the shopping center.
Stangl repeatedly argues that all parties believed the lease negotiations were on a "fast track basis."

Fast track negotiations do not

amount to an understanding that Stangl was purchasing the property.
Instead, the necessary prerequisites for promissory estoppel are a
promise
plaintiff

which

is

acting

"sufficiently
as

a

definite

reasonable

circumstances, would be justified

and

and

prudent

certain

that

the

person

under

the

in placing reliance upon it."

Petty v. Gindy Manufacturing Corp.. 17 Utah 2d 32, 404 P.2d 30, 35-36
(Utah 1965) . No matter how vigorously Stangl repeats throughout his
brief that the negotiations were on a fast track basis, it cannot
make the alleged promise definite and certain and cannot make the
purchase of a shopping center reasonable when Stangl failed to advise
Ernst he was doing so.
Stangl admitted at trial that he never told Ernst:
•

The June 3, 1988 letter which said he was acquiring the property
by the end of June was wrong;

•

He was taking action to acquire title to the property;

•

He had entered into an option agreement to buy the property;
-11-

•

He was going to purchase Aetna's note;

•

He borrowed money from the bank to buy the property; and

•

When he was closing on the purchase.
Trying to concoct reliance in the face of these concessions,

Stangl also argues that because Ernst sent financial statements to
him, Ernst must have assumed that he was buying the property.

To the

contrary, the parties had discussed the need for improvements to the
location and in fact, Ernst was spending its own money on architects.
The

financial

statements

were

for

Stangl

to

use

for

obtaining

financing, but Stangl's own admissions acknowledge he never told
Ernst it was for purchase of the property.
Stangl cites Mahoney v. McDonald's Corporation, 770 F.2d 123
(8th Cir. 1985).

(Brief of Appellee, pp. 42-43).

This is remarkable

due to the marked differences between the conduct of Dr. Mahoney (a
doctor in Missouri) and Mr. Stangl (a real estate developer in Utah
for over thirty years whose net 1988 net worth was approximately
$24 million).

Dr. Mahoney expressly communicated to McDonald's prior

to purchasing the property that he was going to buy the property and
wanted to make sure that a lease was going to be sent back.
McDonald's a copy of the option agreement for the land.

He sent

Furthermore,

Dr. Mahoney had already signed the lease and sent it to McDonald's.
McDonald's prepared the lease and already approved it but for a
signature.

McDonald's real estate agent said, "We have a deal."

In

this case, Stangl admits he never sent the option agreement to Ernst.
-12-

He never told Ernst he was closing on the property or taking steps to
acquire title.

To the contrary of the Mahoney case, Ernst's letter

said:
Since we have several issues unresolved and have
possibility of terminating the negotiations if
significant issues can not be settled, we have
redrafted the Lease as you requested.

the
the
not

(September 12, 1988 letter, Addendum K to Brief of Appellant.)
Stangl contends that his purchase occurred after the alleged
"promise" on August 2, 1988.7

However, his sworn discovery responses,

which he signed on October 5, 1989, state:
Believing that a binding lease agreement was in place,
Stangl exercised his option to purchase the property on
July 28, 1988.
Answers to Interrogatories, No. 38.

(Attached to Brief of Appellee

as last page of Exhibit A to Exhibit N.)
Stangl's sworn interrogatory responses reveal his position in
1989 that he believed Ernst had "promised" by virtue of sending an
unsigned, unexecuted letter of intent and that he acted on July 28,
1988.

His efforts at trial and on appeal to change all this to

actions after August 2, 1988 are nothing short of remarkable.
attempts

are

inconsistent

with Stangl's

own

sworn

Such

interrogatory

responses, his letters and the actual events.

7

For example, even though Stangl's loan application to Valley
Mortgage acknowledged that he would have to pay back taxes on the
property, he tries to claim that the taxes were something new and
he could have withdrawn from the closing. He also ignores his own
letters and those of his own attorneys which indicate that all
material items were done prior to August 2, 1988 for the purchase.
-13-

The Mahoney case supports the finding of promissory estoppel in
an entirely different context.
should be followed.

In his brief, Stangl agrees Mahoney

If an ordinary and reasonably prudent person

such as Dr. Mahoney can make sure that McDonald's knows beforehand he
is going to take a decisive and expensive step such as acquiring the
piece of property, an admitted sophisticated real estate developer
for over thirty years who owned over 1.5 million square feet of
leasable space could have ensured that Ernst knew he was buying the
property in reliance.

The uncontroverted facts and Stangl's own

admissions and testimony
responses

or his trial

(whether one believes his
testimony),

establish

that

interrogatory
there was no

reasonable reliance.
Utah case law requires that in order to be liable, the promisor
be "aware of all material facts" and know the promise will induce
specific action in reliance upon the promise.

Andreason v. Aetna

Casualty and Surety Co., 848 P.2d 171 (Utah App. 1993); Union Tank
Car Co. v. Wheat Brothers, 15 Utah 2d 101, 387 P.2d 1000 (Utah 1964) .
Additionally, the promise must be one which the promisor should
reasonably expect to induce action.

Ernst had been advised in June

1988 that Stangl would own the property by the end of June. (R. 34 98500.)

In July, Stangl submitted documents to the City of West Jordan

in which he

inaccurately

listed

(R. 3789-90; Exhibits 7, 19.)
this falsehood.

(R. 3778.)

himself

as the property owner.

Stangl admitted he never corrected

Reliance upon a representation one knows
-14-

is untrue is not reasonable, so the "reasonable reliance" intent of
promissory estoppel is not present.
Utah promissory estoppel law and even the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts. § 13 9 further require that the promise induced action
which was foreseeable.

Stangl's expenditures in the wake of his own

unequivocal representations to Ernst that he would not agree to
material terms of the lease were unforeseeable.

In fact, he never

bothered to apprise Ernst of his expenditures at the time.

If such

unexpected and unannounced actions are viewed as foreseeable, parties
to unsuccessful negotiations will always have an incentive to bring
a promissory estoppel claim.

For example, if two parties are nego-

tiating for a supply contract of widgets and the potential purchaser
decides the price is too high and does not want to enter into the
contract, the seller could sue, claiming he purchased a widget plant
in reliance upon a promise that the negotiations would conclude
satisfactorily.

Affirming the trial court's decision could also

affect everyday real estate transactions.
tiating for the purchase of a residence.

Buyer and seller are negoBuyer, thinking that he can

eventually get the seller down to his price, purchases a $10,000 hot
tub without telling the seller because he does not want to show any
weakness in negotiations.

If the seller refuses to drop his price

and sells to another party, the frustrated buyer could sue under a
promissory estoppel theory and demand reimbursement for the hot tub.
Affirming this decision could result in these and many more expanded
-15-

applications

in

contravention

of

the

statute

of

frauds

and

established promissory estoppel law in Utah.
C.

Damages Cannot Be Awarded Pursuant to Promissory Estoppel
for Voluntary Choices Made Two and One-Half Years After the
Alleged Breach of Promise.

The alleged promise occurred August 2, 1988.

Ernst terminated

the contract negotiations on September 29, 1988.

Stangl sold the

property

in March 1991.

Between the time that he acquired the

property and September 29, 1988, Stangl had only spent $7,380.59 in
onsite improvements at the Jordan Valley Plaza.

(Exhibit 88A(a).)

During the next 2 1/2 years, Stangl claims that he incurred additional costs of over $880,000.00.

The trial court awarded Stangl

damages so that he would be made entirely whole from his purchase of
the Jordan Valley Plaza to the time that he sold it 2 1/2 years
later.8
Once again, Mahoney is illustrative.
applies to this appeal.

Stangl agrees that Mahoney

In Mahoney, although the court found under

the unique facts of that case that promissory estoppel was appropriate, the appellate court reversed on the methodology of damages
used by the trial court, noting that damages in promissory estoppel
cases:

8

For reasons discussed in Ernst's opening brief and hereafter,
the trial court erred and over-compensated Stangl. However, for
purposes of this section, the point is that the methodology is
inconsistent with promissory estoppel law.
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may be limited as justice requires. It would be unjust for
Mahoney to hold the 109 building indefinitely while
McDonald's paid interest on the purchase price. Instead,
Mahoney was entitled to a reasonable time to sell the
building or make alternative disposition of it.
Mahoney, 770 F.2d at 128.

The court further held that Mahoney's

failure to sell the building must have been based on his decision
that he could do better for himself by making an alternative disposition of the building.

Therefore, Mahoney was no longer acting in

reliance on the promise but on the basis of his own decision.

The

court held that Mahoney was entitled to five months' time actually
spent in deciding how to dispose of the building under the facts of
that case, but that:
[S]ubsequent expenses are Mahoney's responsibility because
they represent a calculated risk on his part to hold onto
the building instead of selling it outright.
Mahoney, 77 F.2d at 128.

Mahoney is also interesting since Mahoney

had two other contiguous buildings and perhaps thought he could do
better by trying to find a package arrangement.
The same thing applies here.

Id. at 128, n.3.

Stangl had two pads of property for

which he had been unsuccessfully trying to get easements from Aetna
prior to his acquisition of the property.

When he eventually sold

the property in 1991, he also sold the two pads as part of it which
resulted in the creative accounting that constituted his numerous
damage exhibits at trial.

Stangl testified that he decided to keep

the property and try to clean it up instead of selling it at the
time.

In Andreason, the court held that damages
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in promissory

estoppel claims are limited to only those sustained to a plaintiff's
detriment in reasonable reliance.

Andreason, supra. 848 P.2d at 175.

Here, the trial court awarded unfettered damages.

The trial court

not only required Ernst to pay for all interest, carrying costs,
expenses, employee costs, overhead expenses of Stangl Construction,
taxes, etc., but also awarded damages for other loans and payoffs
that Stangl had with the bank.
awarding

benefit

of

the

All of this resulted in effectively

bargain

damages

instead

of

promissory

estoppel damages which "are limited as justice requires."
D.

Utah Trials Should Not Be Fishing Expeditions.

The first part of this case was tried in February 1993.

Stangl

continually changed his damage exhibits in the middle of trial by
bringing new versions each morning of trial and sometimes after the
lunch recess.
mation.
error.

Ernst moved to exclude the new exhibits and new infor-

The court denied that motion.
Ernst then moved to bifurcate.

That alone was prejudicial
Implicitly acknowledging the

problems with the damage exhibits and discovery abuses, the trial
court granted the motion to bifurcate.

Thereafter, Ernst again sent

interrogatories asking that the documents and exhibits be supplemented.

Notwithstanding this, he created new damage exhibits and

delivered another $48,000.00 of checks Saturday evening before trial
commenced on Tuesday morning in 1994.

Amazingly, the trial court

included this amount in the damage award to Stangl as well.

A full

chronology of this is set forth in Ernst's Objection to Introduction
-18-

of Evidence Not Produced in Discovery which was filed on February 23,
1994 and is attached to this brief at Addendum C.

(R. 2039-2081.)

Stangl's response to this on appeal is curious:
Stangl's out-of-pocket costs stem from numerous, complicated financial transactions and it was necessary to review
a substantial number of documents concerning those transactions to actually calculate those costs.
(Stangl's Brief

of Appellee, p. 48, n.42.) Stangl

changes were made during trial.

JEdL

admits

these

This sandbagging is precisely

what pretrial discovery was meant to avoid; parties should have the
documents and the calculations in advance of trial.

In this case,

Ernst submitted interrogatories in 1989 asking for production of all
this information.
delivered

Two more sets of interrogatories were subsequently

to Stangl.

Finally, after the three versions of the

damages exhibits at the 1993 trial, Ernst served a fourth set of
discovery requests for information on damages.
by claiming that Ernst had everything.
evening

during

trial

Stangl

amounting to $48,333.43.

provided

Stangl answered them

Nonetheless, on Saturday
a new

exhibit

and

checks

It is inconsistent with the discovery rules

to require a party to respond in the middle of trial to shifting
sands.
Stangl acknowledges these sands were shifting but attempts to
avoid

it by claiming that Ernst had the documents. Nonetheless,

Stangl had to admit that the $48,000.00 worth of checks had never
been provided.

Stangl attempts to avoid this dilemma by claiming
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that he told Ernst in his interrogatory responses that he had to pay
interest, but that ignores the fact that interest was accruing on a
variety of obligations, all of which were part of the "numerous,
complicated financial transactions."

Stangl simply cannot escape the

fact that he did not produce many documents to Ernst which were
produced during trial.

Even the damages exhibits themselves should

have been produced long before the middle of the trial--especially
since the damages phase of trial was one year later.
Furthermore, a detailed review of the exhibits demonstrates very
clever and complicated assumptions made within the damage calculations.

For example, vacancy rates on the pads of property, and

therefore the values for the vacancy rates, sometimes appear and
sometimes disappear in the exhibits.
larly

change.

Since

these

were

Out-of-pocket expenses simiall

calculations, he was free to concoct
assumptions.

Stangl's

documents

the best version

and

from the

This is far different than simply adding up numbers to

come up with damages.

Assumptions were contained within the damages

exhibits relating to the value of the pads which should be deducted
from

the ultimate

depreciation

and

sale
the

in

like.

1991

and

relating

By changing

those

to

tax

treatment,

calculations

and

exhibits in the midst of trial, Ernst was deprived of the ability to
examine

carefully

the calculations

cross-examine the parties.

so that

it could

effectively

Trial counsel for Ernst was handed a

complicated multi-page damages exhibit just as the witness was taking
-20-

the stand, then immediately had to listen to the direct examination
while simultaneously thinking about the impending cross-examination
based on "surprise" exhibits and a "surprise" damages theory.

This

is precisely the reason for the discovery rules--so that trials are
not explorations of "numerous, complicated financial transactions"
which have been prepared by one side only to be shown to the other
side during trial.
E.

Stangl's ambush trial tactics prejudiced Ernst.

Claims of Ernst's Failure to Marshal the Evidence Will Not
Salvage the Trial Court's Decision.

Stangl devotes a substantial portion of his brief on appeal to
his claim that Ernst failed to marshal the evidence.
marshal the evidence.

Ernst did

Stangl attempts to deflect this Court's atten-

tion from the legal issues by uttering claims of failure to marshal
evidence.

Even giving Stangl the benefit of doubt on all the facts,

errors of law were still made by the trial court in four areas:
1.

The application of promissory estoppel to eviscerate

the statute of frauds, contrary to settled Utah precedent;
2.

The

use

of

promissory

estoppel

to

revive

failed

contract negotiations, contrary to Utah law;
3.

Application of promissory estoppel with regard to the

purchase of the property, notwithstanding that Ernst did not know of
all material facts since Stangl admitted at trial he never told Ernst
that he was buying the property; and
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4.

The trial court's error of law in its remedy and

methodology for arriving at damages.
The above are errors of law, not fact.

No matter how vigorously

Stangl argues about marshaling the evidence, it is uncontroverted
that the following points are true:
1.

Even

though

exchanged which required

a

number

of

letters

of

the other party to sign

intent

were

(all of which

provided that there was no binding agreement until a signed lease had
been executed) , none of these documents were ever signed by both
parties.
2.

Numerous offers and counteroffers, beginning in late

June 1988 through September 14, 1988, occurred between the parties.
3.

No agreement was reached between the parties as of

September 29, 1988 (as found by the trial court).
4.

Stangl acquired the property in early August 1988, the

contract negotiations terminated September 29, 1988, and Stangl sold
the property in March 1991.
5.

The

methodology

for

damages

included

all

money

invested by Stangl on his secret purchase of the property and all
money

invested

during

the

two

and

one-half

years

after

the

September 29, 1988 termination of negotiations minus what Stangl
received when the property was purchased in March 1991.
The

above

pretation.

facts

are

undisputed

and

not

subject

to

inter-

On the face of these facts, the decision cannot be
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affirmed without overruling Utah cases.

The problems inherent in the

trial court's decision in this case are not factual.

They are errors

of law in the application of the law to the facts, and in attempting
to make new law for Utah.
CONCLUSION
The decision of the trial court should be reversed.

Utah law

simply does not countenance a decision which effectively nullifies
the statute of frauds and opens up all contract negotiations to
claims of promissory estoppel.

Solid Utah precedent has always

followed common sense and held that the reason for the statute of
frauds

is

to

agreement.

ensure

that

the parties

know

the

details

of

the

The trial court's decision holds Ernst liable for a

surreptitious

purchase

of

property

for

over

$1 million.

Utah

precedent is clear that when parties are in the midst of contract
negotiations

which

then

terminate

unsuccessfully,

promissory

estoppel cannot be used to revive those negotiations or to claim
damages as a result.

When promissory estoppel is alleged by a party,

the Utah courts have always required the following elements to be
proven:

that the party being bound to the promise knew all material

facts in making the promise, that the promisee reasonably relied, and
that the damages are limited as justice requires.

A sophisticated

real estate developer like Stangl should not be entitled to purchase
property without even advising the party he was negotiating with of
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the

purchase,

then

sue

for

those

damages

when

his

multiple

counteroffers are unsuccessful.
Even if the decision is not reversed outright, the case should
be remanded for a new trial.

Trial must be held on the liability

issues and the multiple damage issues.

Numerous errors were made in

the computation and calculation of damages and in the methodology
used.

Stangl's own testimony and exhibits show he had only spent

approximately $7,000.00 in out-of-pocket expenditures in reliance
upon the alleged promise prior to the time Ernst terminated contract
negotiations.

However, the court awarded $331,391.00 in damages.

This also included amounts that had never been produced to Ernst
during trial

(such as $48,333.43 of checks allegedly for interest

paid to a private party).

Ernst was never afforded the opportunity

to examine the documents and computation of damages which no doubt
led to the errors made by the trial court.

At a minimum, this case

should be remanded with the appropriate instructions for retrial.
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1ST CASE of Level 1 printed in FULL format.
TRIAX PACIFIC; INC, a Utah corporation, Plaintiff<k*mterdefend«^
v. AMERICAN
INSURANCE COMPANY, a (IX Utah) foragn corporation, and FIREMAN'S FUND INSURANCE
COMPANY, a foreign corporation, Defsodanta-Counterclaimanta-AppeUeea.
No. 94-4091
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 31097

November 2, 1995, Filed
NOTICE: [*1] RULES OF THE TENTH CIRCUIT
COURT OF APPEALS MAST LIMIT CTEATION TO
UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS. PLEASE REFER TO
THE RULES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THIS CIRCUIT.
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Reported in Tkble Caae
Format at: 69E3d548,1995
US. App. LEXIS 37888.
PRIOR HISTORY: ( D C No. 9O-CV-1036).
JUDGES: Before BALDOCK,
BRORBY, Circuit Judges.

HOLLCWAY, and

OIWIONBY: WILLIAM J. HOLLCWAY, JR,
OPINION: ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case,
res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments;
nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of the court's General
Order filed November 29, 1993. 151 EMX 470.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this
panel has determined unanimously mat oral argument
would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. R 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9.
The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument, nl
nl We have considered the request for oral argument by plaintiff and find that argument would not
be beneficial.

[•2]
Plaintiff Triax Pacific, lac. appeals from the district
court's order granting summary judgment in favor of
the defendants on all o7 plaintiffs breach of contract
and promissory estoppel claims. W& affirm.
I
In late July or early August 1990, RG & B
Contractors, Inc. defaulted on its contract with the
Department of the Navy for renovation of 169 housing units on the island of Guam. R. at 60, 74, 122,
164, 228. Defendants American Insurance Company
and Fireman's Fund were RG & B's sureties on the
Navy contract. n2 Id. at 1, 13, 61, 74. After the default, defendants solicited bids from plaintiff and other
contractors for completion of the construction work left
unfinished. Id. at 61, 105. Defendants hired John
Sevier as their agent to solicit bids and make recommendations. Id. at 306.
n2 American Insurance Company is a wholly
owned subsidiary of Fireman's Fund Insurance
Company. The two companies are referred to collectively as "defendants" throughout this opinion.
As part of the bidding process, [*3] defendants supplied the bidders, including plaintiff Triax, with a written Invitation for Bids. Id. at 76, 106. The Invitation
for Bids provided that a "contract for completion will
be entered into between the successful bidder and the
Surety." Id. at 106. It further provided that any bid
would be subject to approval of the Navy. Id.
Plaintiff submitted its written bid prior to the bidding
deadline but later withdrew the bid when it discovered
an $ 800,000 error. Id. at 61, 112-13. On October 5,
1990, defendants' agent Sevier wrote defendants indicating that even if the error were accounted for, plaintiff
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would have been the low bidder. Id. at 114.

they did so. Id. at 202-03.

On October 30, 1990, Mr. Sevier telephoned Robert
Christiansen, plaintiffs vice president. According to
Mr. Christiansen's deposition testimony, their conversation proceeded as follows:

Mr. Sevier did inform the Navy representative that defendants wanted to tender plaintiff as replacement contractor. Mr. Sevier further requested that plaintiff be
allowed to inventory materials stored by RG & B. Id. at
63, 102. A Navy representative accompanied plaintiffs
representatives to the jobsite where they began an inventory. Id. at 63, 202, 217. Representatives of Western
Alaska Contractors also performed an inventory of the
jobsite. Id. at 79.

John Sevier called me up and said: "How would you
like to go to work in Guam?"
And I said, T d love to."
He says: "Will you take it at the price you have submitted?"
And I said: "What price?"
And he said: "Your corrected bid with the eight hundred thousand."
And I said: "Yes, we'll take the job at that price."
Id. at[*4]405. Mr. Sevier then stated "the job is yours,
providing you can go out there to the government and
prove to them that you are a competent contractor . .
. .By the way, they are deleting the SSP credit. Please
do a credit proposal for that to submit to the Navy when
you get there." Id. at 522. Plaintiff alleges that during
this conversation, Mr. Sevier also promised to tender
plaintiff to the Navy as completion contractor. Id.
Also on October 30, 1990, Mr. Sevier sent a fax to
Mr. Christiansen requesting that plaintiff be prepared to
respond to the Navy's correspondence deleting certain
Specialized Supplemental Personnel from the completion contract at the meeting to be held in Guam. Id. at
118. Mr. Christiansen prepared an estimate for contract modification showing a credit of $ 233,604 toward
plaintiff s previously-submitted bid amount. Id. at 121,
211-12.
On November 3, 1990, plaintiffs representatives,
including its president, accompanied Mr. Sevier to
Guam. Id. at 62, 79. Mr. Sevier also invited representatives of another contractor; International Bridge
Corporation/Western Alaska Contractor!, to travel to
Guam at the same time. Id. at 70, 179. On November
[+5] 5, 1990, plaintiff presented its qualifications to the
Navy in Guam. Id. at 63,
During the November 5 meeting, the Navy's representative, Mr. Putnam, explained that defendants had three
options for dealing with RG & B's default: (1) completing a takeover contract with a contractor, (2) doing
nothing and allowing the Navy to reprocure the project;
or (3) tendering a contractor to die Navy. Plaintiffs
representatives were informed that defendants had not
yet selected an option and the Navy could not proceed
in drafting a contract with an acceptable contractor until

On November 5, Mr. Sevier also requested a "best and
final offer" from both plaintiff and Western Alaska. Id.
at 79. [*6] Plaintiffs representatives objected that they
believed they already had been awarded the contract.
Mr. Sevier was apologetic but explained that defendants
wanted him to obtain new bids. Id. at 329-30. Plaintiff
Triax presented a revised, verbal bid of $ 10,869,000 in
exchange for the deletion of certain inspection work on
the project. Id. at 63-64, 71, 181,217. Wsstern Alaska
also provided a new bid in the amount of $ 10,996,000,
but indicated that they might further reduce their bid to
$ 10,769,000. Id. at 70, 134-35.
After receipt of the plaintiffs best and final offer;
Mr. Sevier again told plaintiff s representatives that they
were the low bidder and would be signing a contract with
the Navy. Id. at 64, 181, 218. Mr. Sevier requested
that the representatives meet with the Navy again on
November 7. Id. at 64. On the morning of November
7, 1990, plaintiffs representatives met with Mr. Sevier.
He presented them with a bottle of champagne and told
them they were the recipients of the contract. Id. at
64-65, 207-08, 218-19. He also stated that the only remaining step would be to obtain the approval of, and
sign a contract with, the Navy. Id. at 208, [+7] 219.
Lata- that day, plaintiffs representatives met with Mr.
Sevier and Mr. Putnam of the Navy. The meeting did
not go as expected because Mr. Putnam indicated he
had just received a letter from Mr. Seidl, defendants'
counsel, in which defendants had elected to have the
Navy reprocure the project rather than selecting the replacement contractor themselves. Id. at 129-30, 182,
333-34. Mr. Putnam told the parties that he believed it
would be necessary for the Navy to obtain new bidding
due to the reprocurement Id. at 222, 452-53. What
was said next is a matter of some dispute, but plaintiffs
representatives left the meeting without an agreement by
the Navy to accept plaintiff as replacement contractor.
Moreover, Mr. Putnam testified that there was no reasonable way that the Navy could have signed a contract
at that point in any event The takeover contract had
not been prepared. The Navy was still working on draft
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language for the release and exoneration agreement to
be entered into between the Navy and the defendants.
There were still problems with the specifications which
needed to be discussed. Id. at 231-32. (In fact, the
completion contract was not finalized until [*8] January
1991. Id. at 302.)
Plaintiffs representatives left Guam and returned to
Utah. They decided to contact defendants directly
to "find out what the problem was." Id. at 320.
Plaintiffs president called George McCarthy, the manager of defendants' San Francisco surety claims office,
on November 12, 1990. Mr. McCarthy indicated there
must have been some confusion and reassured him that
plaintiff would be tendered to the Navy. Id. at 58, 65,
224.
Plaintiffs representatives met with representatives of
the defendants on November 14,1990, in San Francisco.
They contacted Mr. Putnam, the Navy representative,
by speaker phone. Mr. Alexander, defendants' senior
surety supervisor, identified plaintiff Triax as the contractor defendants wanted to tender to the Navy during
this conversation. Mr. Putnam agreed to accept plaintiff upon receipt of written confirmation. Id. at 57-58,
65-66, 246.
Subsequent to the meeting on November 14, 1990,
plaintiff was requested to submit a written commitment
reflecting its best and final offer and the other terms discussed in Guam, which it did on November 16, 1990.
Id. at 66, 141, 226. The commitment included the cost
of curing [*9] items on a list of defects which was shown
to plaintiffs representatives on November 7, 1990, in
Guam. Id. at 142. The list included a revised credit for
deletion of a special inspection program in the amount of
$ 385,000, which had been discussed during the Guam
trip. Id.
Defendants replied to the commitment letter on
November 21, 1990, objecting to some of its terms as
non-conforming to die bidding instructions. R. at 66,
143. Defendants indicated that they had received conforming proposals in die interim and that all current
proposals would be considered. Id. at 144.
Defendants wrote plaintiff on December 5, 1990, stating plaintiff would have to lower its bid or not be eligible
for the contract Id. at 66. Plaintiff refused to lower
its bid. M L Sevier recommended to defendants that
they use Western Alaska because of its lower bid. Id.
at 301. Defendants gave Western Alaska written notice of acceptance of their bid and tendered them to the
Navy on January 18, 1991. Id. at 72, 175-76. Plaintiff
Triax brought this action alleging breach of contract and
promissory estoppel theories.

II
As a threshold matter, defendants challenge our jurisdiction to consider [*10] plaintiffs appeal.
Plaintiff filed its notice of appeal on March 29, 1994,
thirty-two days after the entry of summary judgment and
twenty-seven days after the magistrate judge assigned to
hear pretrial matters denied plaintiffs motion to amend
its complaint to state a cause ofaction in tort. Defendants
contend that plaintiffs appeal from the order granting
summary judgment was untimely.
Defendants' motion to dismiss is clearly without
merit. Plaintiffs notice of appeal was not untimely;
it was premature. The summary judgment order did
not dispose of the defendants' counterclaim. An order
becomes final and appealable only when it ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to
do but execute the judgment. See Mm Cauwenberghe u
Biard, 486 US. 517,521-22,100L. Ed. 2d517,108 S.
O. 1945 (1988); 28 US.C. 1291. Defendants' counterclaim was voluntarily dismissed on December 1, 1994,
after notice from this court of the apparent prematurity
of the appeal. Once this counterclaim was dismissed,
Triax's premature notice of appeal ripened and a new
notice of appeal was unnecessary. See Lewis u RE
Goodrich Co., 850E2d 641, 645 (10th Cir. 1988)(diacussing procedure where premature [+11] notice of appeal is filed). It is of no moment that the premature
notice of appeal was filed more than thirty days after the
order granting summary judgment was entered. n3
n3 Moreover, the summary judgment order was
also not final so long as Triax's motion to amend its
complaint rwnained outstanding. Triax did not properly object in the district court to the magistrate's
denial of its motion to amend. For this reason, we
cannot consider die merits of Triax's appeal from
the magistrate's order. See In re Griego, 64 E3d
580, 583 (10th dr. 1995Xp%xty waives objections
to magistrate's order not presented to district court).
However, die existence of the pending motion before
the magistrate prevented the order granting summary
judgment from becoming final for purposes of ap~
peal.

m
We turn now to the merits of plaintiffs appeal. "We
review the grant or denial of summary judgment de novo,
applying the same legal standard used by the district
court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)." Ingels v. Thiokol
Corp. [*12] , 42 E3d 616, 620 (10th Cir. 1994){c\ling Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc. u First Affiliated Sec.,
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Inc., 912 Eld 1238,1241 (10th Cir. 1990)). "Summary
judgment is appropriate if 'there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Hagelin for
President Comm. v. Craves, 25 E3d 956, 959 (10th
Cir. 1994Xqoo6ng Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)), cert, denied, 130 L. Ed. 2d 880, 115 S. Ct. 934 (1995).
A
The first count of plaintiffs complaint seeks damages
for breach of an oral contract to award the construction
contract to plaintiff. Plaintiff contends that this contract was formed during the telephone conversation between John Sevier and Robert Christiansen on October
30, 1990. n4

n4 The record does not clearly reflect the district
court's basis for granting summary judgment to the
defendants on this count of plaintiffs complaint.
The court's minute order states that it granted summary judgment on Counts I and m because it "found
no cause of action." R. at 569. Nevertheless we
can affirm a trial court's entry of summary judgment
upon any basis which appears of record. Jones v.
Unisys Corp, 54 E3d 624, 628 (10th Cir. 1995).
1*13]
Defendants argue the alleged contract is barred by the
statute of firauds. Defendants further contend that there
was no "meeting of the minds" sufficient to form a binding contract We need not reach the issue whether the
purported contract falls within the statute of frauds because we agree that no binding contract was formed under the facts presented.
Under Utah contract law, a construction hid constitutes an offer which, if unconditionally accepted, forms
a binding contract RJ. Dam Omttr. Co. u Child,
122 Utah 194, 247P.ld817,819 (Utah 1952). Such acceptance "requires manifestation of unconditional agreement to all of the terms of die offer and an intention to
be bound thereby." Id.; see also Col Vbdsworih Constr.
v. City of St. George, 898 Rid 1372, 1376 (Utah
1995). If such terms have not been completely agreed
upon, however, or will not be final until memorialized
in writing, there is no contract:
If the preliminary agreement is incomplete, it being apparent that die determination of certain details is deferred until die writing is made out; or if an intention
is manifested in any way that legal obligations between
the parties shall be deferred until die writing [+14] is

made, the preliminary negotiations and agreements do
not constitute a contract.
Daum, 247 P. 2d at 820, quoting Restatement of
Contracts 26, cmt. a. See also Cessna Fin. Corp.
v. Meyer, 575 P.2d 1048, 1050 (Utah 1978)(no contract formed unless there is a meeting of the minds as
to all of its essential terms); Engineering Assocs., Inc.
v. Irving Place Assocs., Inc., 622 P.2d 784, 787 (Utah
1980)(omi8&ion of material terms prevents formation of
contract, and if contracting parties make it clear that they
do not intend that there should be legal consequences unless and until a formal writing is executed, there is no
contract until that time); Crismon v. Western Co. ofN.
Am., 742 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah App. . / ^ ( p r e l i m i nary negotiations do not form contract).
Here, plaintiff Triax withdrew its bid. Rather than soliciting a new bid, defendants made a direct counteroffer
to plaintiff for completion of the project. However, the
Invitation for Bids clearly contemplated that any such
contract for completion would be in writing. Plaintiff
could not reasonably have believed that Mr. Seviar's
oral statements alone constituted agreement as to all material terms of the [*15] construction contract. There
remained many items to be resolved, most notably the
credit to be given for deletion of the specialized supplemental personnel and the identity of the contracting
parties (i.e., whether plaintiff would be contracting with
defendants or directly with the Navy). Negotiations continued during November 1990 and broke down after that
time.
Once negotiations broke down with plaintiff, defendants were free to accept an offer from a competing
bidder.
When bids are solicited and are sent in for simultaneous opening, or for consideration all together, a bidder
should usually be held reasonable in supposing that a
bid is rejected as soon as one of the competing bids is
accepted. But a mere notice of acceptance may not have
any operation in this latter case, for the reason that a formal written contract is contemplated. It has been held
that each bid remains open for acceptance for a reasonable time so long as no contract with a competing bidder
has actually been consummated.
J. Perillo, Corbin on Contracts 3.41 (2d ed. 1993) (emphasis added).
It is unditpyfrd that plaintiff Triax continued the negotiating process by submitting a subsequent "best [+16]
and final offer," that plaintiffs attempted written memorial of these terms was rejected by defendants as nonconforming, and that plaintiff never signed the contem-
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plated written contract with the defendants or the Navy.
We conclude that no valid, binding construction contract
was formed between plaintiff and the defendants as the
result of the conversation of October 30, 1990. The district court properly entered summary judgment on the
first count of plaintiffs complaint.
B
The second count of plaintiffs complaint alleges the
formation of a contract on November 7, 1990, after
plaintiff submitted its best and final offer. R. at 6, 27.
This count is styled "Breach of Contract Arising from
Oral Solicitation, Oral Modifications of Solicitation,
Offer and Acceptance." However, the district court generously construed this count, at plaintiffs request, to
allege the breach of a contract to tender plaintiff Triax
to the Navy as replacement contractor. Id. at 607. For
this reason, we likewise analyze Count II on a contract
to tender theory only.
Wfe agree with the district court that this alleged contract also fails because plaintiff gave no valid consideration for defendants9 promise [*17] to tender plaintiff
to the Navy and because there is no evidence of a meeting of die minds sufficient to form the alleged contract
to tender. Defendants admit having promised to tender
plaintiff to the Navy. However, to constitute consideration for a binding contract, the promise must have been
"bargained for" by plaintiff. Restatement (Second) of
Contracts 71 (1981). It is clear from the evidence of
record that plaintiffs bid, its best and final offer, and
the negotiations which resulted therefrom, were entered
into in the hope of winning the construction contract,
and were not bargained for consideration for the alleged
promise to be tendered to die Navy. Any promise to
tender was merely gratuitous. See Zoby v American
Fidelity Co., 242 E2d 76, 78-79 (4th Cir. 1957).
For die same reason, there was no "meeting of the
minds" sufficient to form the alleged contract to tender.
Moreover, there waa also no contract formed based on
submission of a lwieed bid. TVs Invitation for Bids
made any such contract subject to approval by the Navy.
The Navy never gave ita approval. Under the circumstances, die parties' preliminary negotiations did not lead
to contract formation. [+l%] See Cessna Fin. Corp., 622
P.2dat787.
Wfe have carefully reviewed the evidentiary materials
cited by plaintiff as supporting its contention that the
promise to tender waa part of an oral contract WD have
been hindered, however; due to inaAvpiaf* record citations. (In several critical instances, citations are grossly
overincluaive, such as citing over 90 pages of deposition testimony in support of a single factual assertion.)

However, our review of these materials confirms the
conclusion of the district judge that the promise to tender "did not contain the material terms necessary to constitute a binding, enforceable contract." R. at 638.
For these reasons we are persuaded that summary
judgment for the defendants on the second count of the
complaint was correct. Ws have also considered other
arguments related to this claim and find that they lack
merit.
C
In the third and final count of its complaint plaintiff Triax avers a promissory estoppel claim. It alleges
that it reasonably relied to its detriment on defendants'
promises. More specifically, plaintiff says it refrained
from bidding on other jobs and incurred costs of traveling to Guam and preparing to perform the construction
work [*19] for defendants.
Utah has adopted the test for promissory estoppel
contained in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts 90
(1981). See Tblboe Constr. Co. u Stoker Paving A
Constr. Co., 682 P.2d 843, 845 (Utah 1984). The
Restatement requires that a plaintiff prove three elements
for such a promissory estoppel claim:
I The promise must be one which the promisor
should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on die part of the promisee;
2. The promise should induce such action or forbearance; and
3. Injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of
the promise.
The Supreme Court of Utah has further promulgated
a set of factual prerequisites for a promissory estoppel
claim, as follows:
that the defendants were aware of all the material facts;
that in such awareness they made the promise when they
knew that the plaintiff was acting in reliance on it; that
the latter; observing reasonable care and prudence, acted
in reliance on the promise and got into a position where
it suffered a lose.
Tblboe, 682 P.2d at 845-46.
The doctrine of promissory estoppel is resorted to only
where circumstances are such that equity and good conscience render its application imperative [+20] in order
to avoid an obvious unfairness and injustice. . . . The
promise or representation relied on must be sufficiently
definite and certain that the plaintiff acting as a reasonable and prudent person under the circumstances would

Page 38
1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 31097, *20

be justified in placing reliance upon it; and in case of uncertainty or doubt the responsibility is upon the plaintiff
to ascertain the facts before acting upon it.
P&tyv. GindyMfg. Corp., 17 Utah 2d 32, 404 R2d
30, 32 (Utah 1965) (footnotes omitted).
Plaintiff, in response to defendants' interrogatories,
asserted that the promise on which it relies was made on
November 7, 1990, when Mr. Sevier informed plaintiffs representatives that Triax was the recipient of the
contract and would be tendered to the Navy. However,
the alleged promise to tender plaintiff to the Navy cannot
form the basis for promissory estoppel based upon the
criteria outlined above. That promise was made within
the context of the process of negotiating the construction
contract, which would not be binding until the written
document was signed, for the reasons outlined above.
Under the circumstances, any promises made were part

of preliminary negotiations and could not form the basis
[*21] for a claim of promissory estoppel. Cf. Lavoie v.
Sqfecare Health Scrv., Inc., 840 P. 2d 239, 249-51 (Wyo.
1992)(*pp\y'mg 90 promissory estoppel principles). The
undisputed facts and circumstances here show that as the
promisor, defendants would not reasonably expect action or forbearance by Triax until a written contract was
consummated. Thus the plaintiff failed to show that its
reliance on statements of defendants or their agent was
reasonable. Id. at 250-51.
IV
The judgment of the United States District Court for
the District of Utah is affirmed.
Entered for the Court
William J. Holloway, Jr.
Circuit Judge

ADDENDUM B:
Citation of Unpublished Opinions/Order and Judgments
1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 37746: 151 F.R.D. 470
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151 F.R.D. 470 printed in FULL format.
IN RE: CITATION OF UNPUBUSHED OPINIONS/ORDERS AND JUDGMENTS
[NO NUMBER IN ORIGINAL]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 37746; 151 F.R.D. 470

November 29, 1993, Filed
JUDGES: [*1] Before MCKAY, Chief Judge, and
LOGAN, SEYMOUR, MOORE, ANDERSON,
TACHA, BALDOCK, BRORBY, EBEL and KELLY,
Circuit Judges.
OPINION: GENERAL ORDER
By this General Order the court suspends 10th Cir. R.
36.3 from January 1, 1994, to December 31, 1995, or
until further order of court. While the rule is suspended,
citation of unpublished opinions and orders and judgments shall be governed by the following provisions:
Unpublished opinions and orders and judgments of
this court are not binding precedents, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. Citation of these unpublished decisions is

not favored. Nevertheless, if it is believed that an unpublished opinion or order and judgment has persuasive
value with respect to a material issue in a case and would
assist the court in its disposition, that decision may be
cited, provided that a copy of the decision is attached to
the brief or other document in which it is cited, or, if
cited in oral argument, is provided to the court and all
other parties.
During the pendency of this order, the court will evaluate the effectiveness of the provisions contained herein.
The court invites interested parties to send written [+2]
comments to the clerk of court. After evaluation, the
court will decide whether the order should be vacated
or its provisions should be incorporated into the rules of
court.

ADDENDUM C;
Ernst's Objection to Introduction of
Evidence Not Produced in Discovery

VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Elizabeth Dolan Winter (5825)
Attorneys for Defendant
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. O. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone:
(801) 532-3333
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
1 STATE OF UTAH
F. C. STANGL, III, an
individual, dba F. C. STANGL
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,

ERNST' S OBJECTION TO
INTRODUCTION OF
EVIDENCE NOT PRODUCED
IN DISCOVERY

Plaintiff,
Civil No. 89-090-2771-CN
vs.
Honorable Michael Murphy
ERNST HOME CENTER, INC. , a
Washington corporation,
Defendant.

This is the damages portion of a lawsuit stemming
from lease negotiations in 1988 between the Plaintiff, F. C.
Stangl and the Defendant Ernst Home Centers, Inc. ("Ernst").
Ernst moves the Court at this time to deny Mr. Stangl' s request
to admit certain evidence allegedly relating to Mr. Stangl' s
claims of damages because the documents and other evidence were
not produced in response to Ernst' s discovery requests
specifically requesting such information.
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Ernst has served Mr. Stangl with four sets of
interrogatories and requests for production of documents in
this case.

Ernst asked Mr. Stangl in each set of discovery to

provide information regarding how he calculates his damages and
to produce documents that he alleges support those
calculations.

In addition, Ernst asked Mr. Stangl to

supplement his responses to its discovery requests as required
by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
On Saturday, February 19, 1994, at 6:00 p.m. Mr. Stangl's
counsel hand delivered to counsel for Ernst a revised damages
analysis document and what Mr. Stangl alleges are copies of
checks he wrote to pay interest on a note in connection with
acquiring property on which to construct an Ernst store.

In

Mr. Stangl' s revised damages analysis he alleges that he is
entitled to damages for the amount he paid the prior owner of
the property, Mr. Brockbank, to acquire the property plus the
amount of interest he paid Mr. Brockbank for the promissory
note signed for the property.

Ernst specifically objects to

information regarding interest paid on the Brockbank note
because Mr. Stangl has not prior to this time included this
item as an item of damage, nor has Mr. Stangl produced any
documents related to such a claim.
Ernst also objects to the admission of evidence concerning
damages related to any "loss of a banking relationship" Mr.

Stangl suffered as a result of any conduct on the part of
Ernst.

No documents or other evidence have been produced to

Ernst explaining the basis of this item of damage or how Mr.
Stangl proposes to calculate such damages.
Ernst specifically asked Mr. Stangl to explain his damage
theory and to produce checks and other documents backing up his
claim for damages in each set of discovery that was served to
his counsel in this case.

The questions propounded by Ernst

are as follows:
DEFENDANT'S SECOND SET QF INTERROGATORIES
AND SECOND DOCUMENT REQUESTS
(answered October 5, 1989)(attached hereto as Exhibit A):
Interrogatory No. 26:

If you claim any item of damages

whatsoever not described in response to any of the preceding
interrogatories, please state the factual basis for each and
every other item of damage you claim against Ernst.

In

response to this interrogatory, please also identify each and
every other document not identified in response to any of the
preceding interrogatories which contains any information
whatsoever regarding your damage claims against Ernst.

Also,

in preparing for this interrogatory, please state all facts
upon which you rely to support your contention that the damages
described in response to this interrogatory were caused by
Ernst.

--. A

Request No. 9:

All documents Stangl relies upon to

support his damage claim or any part of his damage claim as
alleged in the Complaint.
Request No. 10:

All documents which support Stangl' s

damage claim and/or show how Stangl has calculated his damage
claim against Ernst.
DEFENDANT' S REQUEST TO SUPPLEMENT RESPONSES TO
THE SECOND SET OF DISCOVERY AND DEFENDANT'S THIRD
SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND THIRD DOCUMENT REQUEST
(answered July 20, 1992)(attached hereto as Exhibit B)
(Mr. Stangl's General Objection to Request to Supplement):
Mr. Stangl objects to Ernst's request to supplement as follows:
"Plaintiff has provided all non-privileged documents in his
possession responsive to all discovery requests and the
information requested has been the subject of deposition
testimony of witnesses for both parties and defendant has had
ample opportunity through discovery in this matter to obtain
the information sought".
Interrogatory No. 3:

Have you prepared or had prepared

any report which purports to calculate the alleged damages that
you claim to have suffered as a result of the actions by Ernst
at issue in this lawsuit?

If so, please identify the report by

date and title, identify the person who has calculated those
damages, the person who wrote the report, the amount of the

damages as calculated, and the factual basis for those
calculations.
Interrogatory No. 5:

How do you calculate your damages?

Please identify all documents which evidence the means by which
you have calculated your damages stated in response to this
interrogatory.

Also, please identify by name, home address and

telephone number all persons who you will call or who you may
call to testify about your alleged damages.
Interrogatory No. 6:

Please state in reasonable factual

detail every act or forbearance to act that you did in reliance
on the Ernst alleged promise to lease your store at 90th South
and Redwood Road.

Also, please state the dollar amount you

claimed to have been damage with respect to each act, or
forbearance to act, identified by you in response to this
interrogatory.
Request No. 1;

Please identify and produce to counsel for

Ernst all documents described in the Third Set of
Interrogatories from Ernst to Stangl or identified in any of
your responses to any of those interrogatories.
ERNST'S FOURTH SET OF INTERROGATORIES
AND FOURTH DOCUMENT REQUEST
(Answered December 7, 1992)(Attached hereto as Exhibit C)
(Mr. Stangl's General Objection to Request to Supplement):
Mr. Stangl objected as follows:

"Plaintiff has provided

all non-privileged documents in his possession responsive to

all discovery requests and the information requested has been
the subject of extensive deposition testimony of witnesses for
i

both parties and defendant has had ample opportunity through

I

discovery in this matter to obtain the information sought. "

j

Interrogatory No. 2:

For each such act that you alleged

constitutes "part performance" state the following ...

."

Mr. Stangl responded, "counsel also provided the documents
wherein Stangl purchased the building and property in 1988.
i

Such documents contain the information relating to the purchase
which only took place because of the agreement with Ernst".
Interrogatory No. 13;

Please supplement all previous

discovery, both interrogatories and requests for production, no
later than December 4, 1992.

If you fail to supplement or

produce documents, defendant will move at trial to exclude any
information or documents which are responsive to these
interrogatories or previous interrogatories and requests for
production.

ERNST' S FIFTH SET OF INTERROGATORIES
AND FIFTH DOCUMENT REQUEST
(answered January 13, 1994)(attached hereto as Exhibit D)
Interrogatory No. 1:

Pursuant to Rule 26(e)(3) of the Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure, please supplement your responses to
Ernst' s Interrogatories and Request and for Production of
Documents.

If you have no new facts or information responsive

to previous discovery requests, please expressly so state.
Interrogatory No. 5:

Have you prepared or had prepared

any report which proports to calculate the alleged damages that
you claim to have suffered as a result of the actions by Ernst
at issue in this lawsuit?
date and title.

If so, please identify the report by

Identify the person who has calculated those

damages, the person who wrote the report, the amount of the
damages as calculated and the factual basis for those
calculations.
Interrogatory No. 7:

How do calculate your damages?

Please identify all documents that evidence the means by which
you have calculated your damages stated in response to this
Interrogatory.

Also please identify by name, home address and

telephone number all persons who you will call or who you may
call to testify about your alleged damages.
Interrogatory No. 8:

Please state in reasonable factual

detail every act or forbearance to act that you did in reliance
on the Ernst alleged promise to lease your store at 90th South

and Redwood Road.

Please include the date you began (including

dates on which you committed to act) and the date you completed
every act you identify in response to this Interrogatory.
Also, please state the dollar amount you claim to have been
damaged with respect to each act or forbearance to act you
identify in response to this Interrogatory.
Request No. 1:

Please identify and produce all documents

described in the Fifth Set of Interrogatories from Ernst to
Stangl or identified in any of your responses to any of those
Interrogatori es.
Request No. 5:

To the extent not already produced in

response to prior document requests, please produce any and all
documents upon which you relied to support any of the
allegations in which you claim you are entitled to damages in
this lawsuit.

Please include check registers, ledgers,

receipts and contracts negotiated with outside contractors that
refer, reflect or relate to the amounts you claim as damages.
Plaintiff responded generally "that his damage exhibit and
all underlying documentation have already been produced to
defendant ... [t]o the extent that plaintiff identifies any
additional documentary evidence or any additional expert or lay
witnesses in support of his damage theories, plaintiff will
seasonably so inform defendant."

ERNST HOME CENTER'S JANUARY 14. 1994
LETTER TO STANGL
(Attached hereto as Exhibit E)
By letter dated January 14, 1994, counsel for Ernst
stressed that "seasonably so informing" Ernst of additional
evidence and witnesses that support Mr. Stangl' s damage claim
would be now. "
MR, STANGL' S FEBRUARY 18, 1994 LETTER
TO ERNST
(Attached hereto as Exhibit F)
By letter dated February 18, 1994, counsel for Mr. Stangl
informed counsel for Ernst that Mr. Stangl was planning to
revise his damage calculations and would deliver the revised
damage calculations on Saturday, February 19, 1994.
FEBRUARY 19, 1994 LETTER FROM STANGL
TO COUNSEL FOR ERNST
(Attached hereto as Exhibit G)
By letter dated February 19, 1994 hand delivered to
counsel for Ernst at 6: 00 p. m. on this Saturday evening, Mr.
Stangl provided Ernst Home Center with checks allegedly showing
amounts Mr. Stangl paid as interest payments on a note to Mr.
Brockbank, the former owner of the property.

Mr. Stangl also

produced a revised document setting forth his calculations of
damages.

This revised document stated "in addition, Mr. Stangl

will testify as to the loss of the banking relationship."

A trial court may refuse to admit evidence that is not
provided to the opposing party in a timely manner.

Hardv v.

Hardv, 776 P. 2d 917, 925 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); Varhol v.
PStiongl Rt fiT PfrSg?nger Corpt , 909 F. 2d 1557, 1566 (7th Cir.
1990)(trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing ro
admit document that a party did not submit to opponent before
trial even where the document was omitted by mistake).
Mr. Stangl's refusal to specify that he was claiming as an
item of damage interest he now alleges he paid on a note to
Brockbank and to produce documents related to such interest
until Saturday evening during a holiday weekend before a trial
starting on Tuesday must bar the admission of such evidence at
trial.

Similarly, Mr. Stangl' s complete failure to quantify or

substantiate his clairr of a "loss of a banking relationship" as
an item of damage must bar him from introducing such testimony
now.

Mr. Stangl' s failure to produce this information in

response to Ernst' s discovery requests deprives Ernst of the
ability to respond to, evaluate and analyze this information.
For these reasons, Ernst respectfully requests the Court to
refuse Mr. Stangl' s request to admit documents and testimony

related to interest he alleges he paid to Mr. Brockbank and
testimony related to any loss of a banking relationship he now
claims.
DATED this

22.
day of February, 1994.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY

j!/2ffX^ Ql4r/ I V W ^ I
Elizabe/th Dolan Winter
Attorneys for Defendant
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct
copy of the within and foregoing Supplemental Trial Brief On
Reliance Damages to be hand delivered this ^ t ?
February, 1994, to the following:
Stephen G. Crockett
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT & BENDINGER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
136 South Main, #500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

day of

Tab A

Stephen G. Crockett, Esq. (A0766)
Kenneth C. Johnsen, Esq. (A4605)
Daniel A. Jensen, Esq. (A5296)
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS
185 South State Street, Suite 1300
Post Office Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Telephone: (801) 53 2-784 0
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
i
)
I
;

F. C. STANGL, III, an
individual,
-Plaintiff,

ANSWER TO DEFENDANT'S SECOND
SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND
SECOND DOCUMENT REQUEST

vs.
Civil No. 89-0202771CN

ERNST HOME CENTER, INC.,
a Washington corporation,

]
Judge Michael Murphy

Defendant.

Plaintiff,
Defendant's

Franz

Second

Set

]
I

C.

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Stangl,

of

III

("Stangl") , responds

Interrogatories

and

Second

to

Document

Request as follows:
GENERAL OBJECTIONS TO INTERROGATORIES
GENERAL

OBJECTION

NO.

1:

Stangl

objects

to

the

interrogatories insofar as they seek information not available to
him at this time.
in this case.

STCL\034 wc

To date, Stangl has not completed any discovery

Stangl believes that many documents and witnesses

seeks irrelevant and privileged information.

Without waiving the

foregoing objections, Stangl responds to Interrogatory No. 25 as
follows:
Yes.

Stangl shall produce non-privileged documents which

provide Ernst with the relevant information sought hereby.
(a)
amount

of

Further to the response of Interrogatory No. 38, the

consideration

paid

to

Mr.

Brockbank

by

Stangl

is

reflected on the Option dated June 29, 1988 and produced herewith.
There are no ongoing negotiations between Stangl and Mr. Brockbank
concerning the subject property.
(b)

See

documents

identified

in part

(a) above and

documents produced herewithINTERROGATORY
whatsoever

NO. 2 6:

not described

If you claim any

in response to any

item of damages
of the

preceding

interrogatories, please state the factual basis for each and every
other item of damage you claim against Ernst.

In response to this

interrogatory, please also identify each and every other document
not identified in response to any of the preceding interrogatories
which contains any information whatsoever regarding your damage
claims against Ernst.
please

state

contention

all

that

Also, in responding to this interrogatory,

facts
the

upon

damages

which

described

interrogatory were caused by Ernst.

STCL\034.wc

you

-48

rely
in

to

support

response

to

your
this

see Appraisal Report of Jordan Valley Plaza dated March 8, 1988,
Option dated June 29, 1988, and other documents produced herewith.
REQUEST NO. 9:

All documents Stangl relies upon to support

his damage claim or any part of his damage claim as alleged in the
Complaint.
RESPONSE:

Stangl objects to Request No. 9 on the grounds that

it is vague and ambiguous, overbroad and seeks privileged information.

Without waiving the foregoing objections, see documents

produced herewith and Response to Interrogatory No. 21.
REQUEST NO. 10;
claim

and/or

All documents which support Stangl's damage

show how Stangl has calculated

his damage

claim

against Ernst.
RESPONSE:

Stangl objects to Request No. 10 on the grounds

that it is vague and ambiguous, overbroad and seeks privileged
information.

Without

waiving

the

foregoing

objections,

see

documents produced herewith and Response to Interrogatory No. 21.
REQUEST NO. 11:

All documents signed by Ernst or any of its

representatives upon which you rely to support your contention that
a binding real estate lease has been formed between you and Ernst
pertaining

to the property

described more particularly

in the

Complaint.
RESPONSE:

See documents produced herewith.

REQUEST NO. 12:
the

possession

STCLV034 ve

of

For the discovery period, all documents in
Stangl,

or

-68-

any

companies,

partnerships,

DATED this

S

day of October 1989.

As to objections:
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS

Stephen G. CropJCett, Esq.
Kenneth C. Jcmnsen, Esq.
Daniel A. Jensen, Esq.
Attorney^ for Plaintiff
As to responses;

STCL\034.vc

77-

VERIFICATION
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

ss.

F. C. STANGL, III, having been first duly sworn upon oath,
deposes and says that he is the plaintiff in the above-entitled
action and that he has read the foregoing and knows the contents
thereof to be true to the best of his knowledge, except as to
matters stated upon information and Relief, and^ as to such he
believes the same to be true.

F. C.yjSTAMGLjlII
A
SUBSCRIBED AND
Hdh^tS*
J. 1989.

SWORN

to

bifore
^

me X&XS

Q ^u^^.

NOTXS¥ PUBLIC,^residing in

My•commission expires:

STCL\0J4 wc
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GIAUQUE, CROCKETT & BENDINGER
Stephen G. Crockett (0766)
Carol Clawson (4813)
500 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
(801) 533-8383
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
F. C. STANGL, III, an
individual,
Plaintiff,
vs.

1 ANSWER TO DEFENDANT'S REQUEST TO
—
) SUPPLEMENT RESPONSES TO THE
) SECOND SET OF DISCOVERY AND
I DEFENDANT'S THIRD SET OF INTERI ROGATORIES AND THIRD DOCUMENT
;I REQUEST
Civil No. 89-090-2771-CN

ERNST HOME CENTER, INC.,
a Washington corporation

Honorable Michael Murphy
Defendant.

]

Plaintiff, F.C. Stangl, III (Stangl), responds to
Defendant's Request to Supplement Responses to the Second Set of
Discovery and Defendant's Third Set of Interrogatories and Third
Document Request as follows:
REQUEST TO SUPPLEMENT
OBJECTION TO REQUEST TO SUPPLEMENT:

Plaintiff objects

to defendant's request to supplement on the grounds that the
request is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative of discovery
already taken in this case.

Plaintiff has provided all non-

privileged documents in his possession responsive to all
discovery requests and the information requested has been the

subject of deposition testimony of witnesses for both parties and
defenaant has had ample opportunity through discovery in this
matter zo obtain the information sought.

THIRD SET OF INTERROGATORIES FROM ERNST TO STANGL
GENERAL OBJECTIONS TO INTERROGATORIES
GENERAL OBJECTION NO. 1:

Stangl objects to the

interrogatories insofar as they seek information that is (1)
protected by the attorney-client privilege; (2) protected by the
attorney work product privilege; (3) protected because it
consists, in whole or in part, of trial preparation materials
and/or documents containing mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions, or legal theories of counsel; (4) otherwise protected
under Rule 26(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; and/or (5)
protected under any other valid privilege.
GENERAL OBJECTION NO. 4:

Stangl objects to each and

every interrogatory and document request including each and every
definition and instruction, to the extent that and insofar as it
attempts or purports to impose requirements or obligations on him
beyond those imposed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
GENERAL OBJECTION NO. 5:

Stangl objects to the

purported "Definitions" incorporated by defendant on the grounds
that, in the aggregate, they are so complex, ambiguous, vague and
burdensome that they create an unreasonable and undue burden upon

-2-

been deposed, and to the extent they are in plaintiffs control,
Stangl does not agree to make them available for any further
deposition testimony except as may be reasonably necessary to
testify to documents produced in conjunction with these
responses.
INTERROGATORY NO. 3:

Have you prepared, or had

prepared, any report which purports to calculate the alleged
damages that you claim to have suffered as a result of the
actions by Ernst at issue in this lawsuit?

If so, please

identify the report by date and title, identify the person who
has calculated those damages, the person who wrote the report,
the amount of the damages as calculated, and the factual basis
for those calculations.
RESPONSE:

See Response to Interrogatory No. 1.

INTERROGATORY NO. 4:
mitigate your damages?

Have you done anything to

If so, please describe in reasonable

factual detail everything you have done to mitigate the damages
and the dollar amount of damages which you have mitigated, if
any, between the date of the alleged breach and the date of your
response.
RESPONSE:

Plaintiff objects to Interrogatory No. 4 on

the grounds that it is unreasonably cumulative and duplicative of
discovery already taken in this case.

Plaintiff has provided all

non-privileged documents in his possession responsive to this
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request and the information requested has been the subject of
deposition testimony of witnesses for both parties.
Subject to this objection, plaintiff responds as
follows:

See the deposition testimony and attached exhibits for

F.C. Stangl and S. Pruitt.
INTERROGATORY NO. 5:
damages?

How do you calculate your

Please identify all documents which evidence the means

by which you have calculated your damages stated in response to
this interrogatory.

Also, please identify by name, home address

and telephone number all persons who you will call, or who you
may call, to testify about your alleged damages.
RESPONSE:

See Response to Interrogatory No. 1. In

addition to the damages set forth in the report responsive to
Interrogatory No. 1, Stangl suffered damages in the form of lost
rental for 1989 and 1991, until the property was sold in March
1991.

That lost rental is calculated as follows:

Ernst
61,949 sq. ft. at $2.74
Less expenses - 7%

$169,740 per year
-11,882

$157, ,858
x 2
$315, ,716

x two years
North Shops - 16,915 so. ft.
Rent w/Ernst Less vacancy •
Expenses

$10 sq. ft.
101
7%

$169, ,150
16, ,915
,840

$140,395
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Rent w/o Ernst - $7 sq. ft.
Less vacancy 15%
Expenses 7%
I

$118,405
17,761
8,288
$ 92,356

Difference

$ 48,039

Total Loss Rent

S363,755

Stangl will testify to the amount of these damages.
INTERROGATORY NO. 6:

Please state in reasonable factual

detail every act, or forbearance to act, that you did in reliance
on the Ernst's alleged promise to lease your store at 90th South
and Redwood Road.

Also, please state the dollar amount you claim

to have been damaged with respect to each act, or forbearance to
act, identified by you in response to this interrogatory.
RESPONSE:

Plaintiff objects to Interrogatory No. 6 on the

grounds that it is unreasonably cumulative and duplicative of
discovery already taken in this case.

Plaintiff is producing or

has previously produced all non-privileged documents in his
possession responsive to this request and the information
requested has been the subject of deposition testimony of
witnesses for both parties.
Subject to this objection, plaintiff responds as follows:
Pursuant to Rule 33(c)

of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,

plaintiff is producing additional documents which provide
information responsive to this interrogatory.

See the deposition

testimony and attached exhibits for F.C. Stangl and S. Pruitt.
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See also plaintiff's memoranda opposing defendant's motion for
summary judgment,
INTERROGATORY NO. 7:

Please state all of the verbatim terms

of the alleged "contract" that you want the court specifically to
enforce against Ernst.

In answering this interrogatory, with

respect to each "contract" term listed by you, please also
identify by date and author the written document allegedly signed
by Ernst upon which you rely for your response.
RESPONSE:

Plaintiff objects to Interrogatory No. 7 on the

grounds that it is unreasonably cumulative and duplicative of
discovery already taken in this case.

Plaintiff has provided all

non-privileged documents in his possession responsive to this
request and the information requested has been the subject of
deposition testimony of witnesses for both parties.
Subject to this objection, plaintiff responds as follows:
See the deposition testimony and attached exhibits for F.C.
Stangl and S. Pruitt.

See also plaintiff's memoranda opposing

defendant's motion for summary judgment.
THIRD SET OF DOCUMENT REQUESTS FROM ERNST TO STANGL
REQUEST NO. 1:

Please identify and produce to counsel for

Ernst all documents described in the Third Set of Interrogatories
from Ernst to Stangl, or identified in any of your responses to
any of those interrogatories.

-8-

Plaintiff further objects on the grounds that the requests are
unreasonably cumulative and duplicative of discovery already
taken in this case.

Subject to these objections, Stangl responds

as follows:
Plaintiff is producing in conjunction with service of these
responses all non-privileged documents responsive to these
requests that may not have been previously produced to the
defendant.
DATED this "ZO^day of July, 1932.
Respectfully submitted,

ISMS
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GIAUQUE, CROCKETT & BENDINGER
Stephen G. Crockett (0766)
Carol Clawson (4813)
500 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
(801) 533-8383
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
F. C. STANGL, III, an
individual,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Plaintiff,

vs.
ERNST HOME CENTER, INC.,
a Washington corporation

Civil No. 89-090-2771-CN
Honorable Michael Murphy

Defendant.

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of ANSWER TO
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST TO SUPPLEMENT RESPONSES TO THE SECOND SET OF
DISCOVERY AND DEFENDANT'S THIRD SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND THIRD
DOCUMENT REQUESTS was mailed, postage prepaid, this
July, 1992, to:
David A. Greenwood
Patrick J. O'Hara
Kathryn H. Snedaker
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
Salt Lake City.

JlluZa^

day of
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GIAUQUE, CROCKETT & BENDINGER
Stephen G. Crockett (0766)
Carol Clawson (4813)
500 Kearns Bvoiding
Salt Lake City, Utah
(801) 533-8383
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
)

F. C. STANGL, III, an
individual,
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)
)
)
)
)

ANSWER TO ERNST'S FOURTH SET OF
INTERROGATORIES, ERNST'S FOURTH
DOCUMENT REQUEST TO STANGL, AND
ERNST'S FIRST REQUEST FOR
ADMISSIONS TO STANGL

)

ERNST HOME CENTER, INC.,
a Washington corporation
Defendant.

) Civil No. 89-090-2771-CN
)
) Honorable Michael Murphy
)
)

Plaintiff, F . C . Stangl, III (Stangl), responds to Ernst's Fourth Set of
Interrogatories, Ernst's Fourth Document Request to Stangl, and E r n s t ' s First
Request For Admissions to Stangl as follows:
REQUEST TO SUPPLEMENT
OBJECTION TO REQUEST TO SUPPLEMENT: Plaintiff objects to
Defendants' Request to Supplement on the grounds that the r e q u e s t is
unreasonably cumulative or duplicative of discovery already taken in this case.
Plaintiff has provided all non-privileged documents in his possession responsive
to all discovery r e q u e s t s and the information requested has been the subject of
extensive deposition testimony of witnesses for both parties and defendant has

had ample opportunity through discovery in this matter to obtain the information
sought.

FOURTH SET OF INTERROGATORIES FROM ERNST TO STANGL
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Specifically identify what act or acts of Stangl
constitutes "part performance" of the lease contract you allege in this lawsuit.
RESPONSE: Plaintiff objects to Interrogatory No. 1 on the grounds that it
is unreasonably cumulative and duplicative of discovery already taken in this
case. Plaintiff has provided all non-privileged documents in his possession
responsive to this request and the information requested has been the subject of
deposition testimony of witnesses for both parties.
Subject to this objection, plaintiff responds as follows: See response to
Interrogatory No. 2.
INTERROGATORY NO. 2: For each such act that you allege constitutes
"part performance," state the following:
a.

Who performed the act;

b.

When the act was performed;

c.

The exact nature of the act; and,

d.

The cost or value of the act.

RESPONSE: Plaintiff objects to Interrogatory No. 2 on the grounds that it
is unreasonably cumulative and duplicative of discovery already taken in this
case. Plaintiff has provided all non-privileged documents in his possession
responsive to this request and the information requested has been the subject of
-218410

deposition testimony of witnesses for both parties. Plaintiff also objects to this
interrogatory on the grounds that the response to this interrogatory may be
ascertained from the business records of the plaintiff which have been produced
to the defendant and that the burden of deriving or ascertaining the answer is
substantially the same for the defendant as it is for the plaintiff.

Plaintiff

specifically refers to the documents produced by the plaintiff on July 20, 1992,
which includes invoices for work done by Stangl in performance of the July 14
agreement. Each invoice references a job number. Counsel for Stangl has also
provided counsel for the defendant a Summary of Improvement Costs of Jordan
Vedley which identifies all work performed in reliance on the July 14 agreement by
job name and number and the total amount spent for each job number. This list is
essentially an index to the invoices provided on July 20, 1992. Counsel also
provided the documents wherein Stangl purchased the building and property in
1988. Such documents contain the information relating to the purchase which
only took place because of the agreement with Ernst.
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: State each and every term of the agreement by
you to sell the Jordan Valley Plaza to Green Isle Development, including but not
limited to forgiveness of debt on other transactions, assumption of debt, cash or
other valuable consideration exchanged. Also, please describe any other
agreements between you and Phillip Holland or Green Isle Development, whether
related to the Jordan Valley Plaza or not, and whether in writing or not, that
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as the subject of extensive briefing in response to defendant's motion for
summary judgment.
INTERROGATORY NO. 13: Please supplement all previous discovery, both
interrogatories and requests for production, no later than December 4, 1992. If
you fail to supplement or produce documents, defendant will move at trial to
exclude any information or documents which are responsive to either these
interrogatories or previous interrogatories and requests for production.
RESPONSE: Plaintiff objects to Defendants 1 Request to Supplement on the
grounds that the request is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative of discovery
already taken in this case. Plaintiff has provided all non-privileged documents in
his possession responsive to all discovery requests and the information requested
has been the subject of extensive deposition testimony of witnesses for both
parties and defendant has had ample opportunity through discovery in this matter
to obtain the information sought. Plaintiff i s , however, providing defendant with
plaintiff's amended damage studies.

FOURTH DOCUMENT REQUEST
Request 1: Please produce all documents relied upon or identified in your
response to the foregoing interrogatories and/or the following requests for
admissions.
RESPONSE: With the exception of the amended damage studies being
supplied to defendant, plaintiff objects to Request No. 1 on the grounds that the
-8mn

the following Friday, but failed to do so. Instead Ernst wrote Stangl and
informed him that they would not open an Ernst Home Center at the Jordan Valley
Plaza because of information contained in a feasibility report initially prepared
for Ernst in 1987. Ernst's refusal to open the center was unrelated to the terms
of the lease. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Response to Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment and attached exhibits •
REQUEST NO. 34: Please admit that the maintenance and repair work you
did, if any, at the Jordan Valley Plaza in the Summer of 1988 is work that you
would have done whether Ernst was going to lease from you or not.
RESPONSE: Plaintiff objects to this Request on the grounds that it is
unreasonably cumulative and duplicative of discovery already taken in this case •
Plaintiff has provided all non-privileged documents in his possession responsive
to this request and the information requested has been the subject of deposition
testimony of witnesses for both parties. Subject to this objection, plaintiff
responds as follows:
Denies. See Response to Interrogatories Nos. 1 and 2 and Response to
Request Nos. 15 and 16.
DATED this Q

day of December, 1992.
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT & BENDINGER
By.
' ' Stephen G. Crockett '
Attorneys for Plaintiff

-3318411

VERIFICATION
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

F.C. Stangl, III being first duly sworn, deposes and says that he has read
the foregoing Answer to Ernst's Fourth Set of Interrogatories, Ernst's Fourth
Document Request to Stangl, and Ernst's First Request for Admissions to Stangl
and that the same are true to the best of his k^ow)^d^^4^oxmatic«r^nd belief.

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this

^XJx^^^UAXuriJL

My Commission Expires:

Notary Public
buci\
Residing atrX> / LSnjyi tf

9-6- n

NOTARY PUBUC
KRISHCMRIOD
36S3 S * * 6 * 6 * C t M
P t f * City. U t t n M 0 6 0
My Commission E i p t r t t
Stptsmosr 6.1994

STATEOPUTAH

J

-3411411

day of December, 1992.

*
LTVUC-L J
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VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
Elizabeth Dolan Winter (5825)
Attorneys for Defendant
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone:
(801) 532-3333
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
FIFTH SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND FIFTH DOCUMENT
REQUESTS FROM ERNST HOME
CENTER, INC. TO FRANZ C.
STANGL, III

F. C. STANGL, III, an
individual,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 89-090-2771-CN

ERNST HOME CENTER, INC. , a
Washington corporation,

Honorable Michael Murphy

Defendant.

Defendant, Ernst Home Center, Inc. ("Ernst") hereby
propounds the following Interrogatories and Document Requests
to the plaintiff, Franz C. Stangl, III, dba F. C. Stangl
Construction Company ("Stangl").

Ernst requests that Stangl

respond to the following Interrogatories and Document Requests
under oath within the time authorized by Rules 33 and 34 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
INTERROGATORY NO. 1:

Pursuant to Rule 26(e)(3) of

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, please supplement your
responses to Ernst' s Interrogatories and Requests for
Production of Documents.
199X45808 1

If you have no new facts or

information responsive to previous discovery requests, please
expressly so state.
INTERROGATORY NO. 2:

Please identify each person

answering or furnishing information used in answering these
interrogatories and the following document requests.
INTERROGATORY NO. 3:

Please identify by name, home

street address, and. telephone number all persons who you will
call, or who you may call, to offer expert testimony at trial
with respect to any issue in this lawsuit.

With respect to

each expert you identify in response to this interrogatory,
please produce a copy of that expert' s curriculum vitae, state
the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify
and state the substance of the facts and opinions to which the
expert is expected to testify.

Also, please provide a summary

of the grounds for each opinion that each such expert will
offer.

Also, with respect to each expert identified in

response to this interrogatory, please identify any and all
reports prepared for you in connection with this litigation by
that expert.

Also, please state whether you would be willing

to voluntarily produce a copy of said reports to Ernst, and
whether you will make that witness available for an oral
deposition without a court order,
INTERROGATORY NO. 4:

Please identify by name, home

street address, and telephone number every person who you will

I99\4S808 1
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call, or who you may call, as a non-expert (i. e. , lay) witness
in the trial in this lawsuit.

With respect to each lay witness

you identify, please produce a copy of that person' s curriculum
vitae if one exists for that person.

Also please state the

subject matter on which each lay witness is expected to
testify, state the substance of the facts and opinions, if any,
to which the lay witness is expected to testify, and a summary
of the grounds for each opinion, if any, that the lay witness
expects to testify about.

Also, please state if you will make

that lay witness available for an oral deposition without a
subpoena-.
INTERROGATORY NO. 5:

Have you prepared, or had

prepared, any report which purports to calculate the alleged
damages that you claim to have suffered as a result of the
actions by Ernst at issue in this lawsuit?

If so, please

identify the report by date and title, identify the person who
has calculated those damages, the person who wrote the report,
the amount of the damages as calculated, and the factual basis
for those calculations,
INTERROGATORY NO. 6:
mitigate your damages?

Have you done anything to

If so, please describe in reasonable

factual detail everything you have done to mitigate the damages
and the dollar amount of damages which you have mitigated, if

199X45808 1
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any, between the date of the alleged breach and the date of
your response.
INTERROGATORY NO. 7damages?

How do you calculate your

Please identify all documents that evidence the means

by which you have calculated your damages stated in response to
this interrogatory.

Also, please identify by name, home

address and telephone number all persons who you will call, or
who you may call, to testify about your alleged damages.
INTERROGATORY NO. 8:

Please state in reasonable

factual detail every act, or forbearance to act, that you did
in reliance on the Ernst' s alleged promise to lease your store
at 90th South and Redwood Road.

Please include the date you

began (including dates on which you committed to act), and the
date you completed every act you identify in response to this
interrogatory.

Also, please state the dollar amount you claim

to have been damaged with respect to each act, or forbearance
to act, you identify in response to this interrogatory.
FIFTH REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
REQUEST KO. \\

Please identify and produce all

documents described in the Fifth Set of Interrogatories from
Ernst to Stangl, or identified in any of your responses to any
of those interrogatories.
REQUEST NO. 2:

Please produce copies of all reports,

if any, prepared for you by any persons who you will call, or

199X45808 1
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who you may call, as an expert witness at trial in this
lawsuit.
REQUEST NO. 3:

Please produce copies of all reports,

if any, prepared for you by any persons who you will call, or
who you may call, as a non-expert witness at trial in this
lawsuit.
REQUEST NO. 4:

Please produce all documents in the

nature of market studies undertaken by you or by persons
retained by you, on the commercial property at 90th South and
Redwood Road at issue in this lawsuit, between January 1, 1980
and the date of your response to this document request.
REQUEST NO. 5:

To the extent not already produced in

response to prior document requests, please produce any and all
documents upon which you rely to support any of the allegations
in which you claim you are entitled to damages in this lawsuit.
Please include check registers, ledgers, receipts and contracts
negotiated with outside contractors that refer, reflect, or
relate to amounts you claim as damages.
REQUEST NO. 6:

Please produce all documents that

reflect efforts by you, if any, to mitigate your alleged
damages.
REQUEST NO. 7:

Please produce all income tax

statements filed on behalf of F. C. Stangl for the years 19881991 inclusive.

199N45808 1
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Stephen G. Crockett, Esq. (0766)
Stephen T. Hard, Esq. (1359)
Steven E. McCowin, Esq. (4621)
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT,
BENDINGER & PETERSON
500 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 533-8383
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

FRANZ C. STANGL, III, an
individual, dba F.C. STANGL
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
Plaintiff,

v.

i
|
)I
\I
;I

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO
FIFTH SET OF INTERROGATORIES
AND FIFTH DOCUMENT REQUESTS
FROM ERNST HOME CENTER, INC. TO
FRANZ C. STANGL, III

ERNST HOME CENTER, INC.,
a Washington corporation,
Civil No. 89-090-2771-CN
Defendant.

]
(Honorable Michael Murphy)

Plaintiff Franz C. Stangl, III objects to the FIFTH SET
OF INTERROGATORIES AND FIFTH DOCUMENT REQUESTS FROM ERNST HOME
CENTER, INC. TO FRANZ C. STANGL, III filed by defendant Ernst
Home Center, Inc. on the ground that all such discovery is barred
by the Court's Scheduling Order and Trial Notice dated November
3, 1993-

Plaintiff further objects on the basis of Rule 4-502(5)

of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration which provides that
all discovery must be completed "no later than thirty (30) days

before the date set for trial of the case."

The deadline set by

rule 4-502(5) expired many months ago.
Without waiving these objections, plaintiff responds
generally that his damage exhibit and all underlying
documentation have already been produced to defendant, and that
Franz C. Stangl, III, is the only witness anticipated to be
called in support of the damage claim.

To the extent that

plaintiff identifies any additional documentary evidence or any
additional expert or lay witnesses in support of his damage
theories, plaintiff will seasonably so inform defendant.
Finally, plaintiff believes that the Court directed the
parties to resolve certain foundational issues regarding
plaintiff's damage theories and damage exhibits.

Plaintiff

stands ready to enter into appropriate discussions with defendant
so as to resolve these issues in an expedited manner.
DATED this

day of January, 1994.
GIAUQUE, CROCKETT, BENDINGER
& PETERSON
500 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 533-8383

Attorneys for Plaintiff
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January 14,

1994

VIA TELEFAX
Stephen G. Crockett
Giauque, Crockett & Bendinger
136 South Main, #500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Re:

Stangl v. Ernst Home Center

Dear Steve:
I received your responses to Ernst Home Center, Inc. ' s
discovery. You object to our discovery on several grounds, then
go on to respond without waiving your objections. Because you
did respond, we are assuming that if we brought a motion to
compel production there is no additional information you would
produce. If this assumption is incorrect, please let me know.
You state that you will "seasonably so inform" Ernst if
Mr. Stangl identifies any additional documentary evidence or any
additional expert of lay witnesses in support of his damage
theories. Steve, if is now January 14, 1994. The trial in this
case begins in a little over one month, on February 22, 1994.
"Seasonably so inform[ing]M Ernst of additional evidence and
witnesses that support Mr. Stangl' s damage claim would be now in
response to these discovery requests. Because you have not
provided us with any such information, we are relying on your
statement that you have produced to us all information in support
of Mr. Stangl' s claims. We will oppose any effort by you to
introduce at trial any documents, witnesses, or experts that we
do not have or have not had an opportunity to depose at this
time.

199\4159?

VAN

COTT, BAGLEY, C O R N W A L L &

MCCARTHY

Stephen G. C r o c k e t t
January 14, 1994
Page 2

I f you have any q u e s t i o n s ,

please

call.

Very t r u l y y o u r s ,

&ATffr*/ TV'" 'V r ' +*>'
E l i z a b e t h Dolan Winter
EDW/lr
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CHARD W GIAUOUE
STEPHEN G CROCKETT
GARY F B E N O l N G E R
ROBERT A PETERSON
R I C H A R D W CASEY
STEPHEN T HARD
M H O STEVEN MARSOEN
STEVEN E MCCOWIN
DOUGLAS H PATTON
STEPHEN R WALORON'
KATMY A LAVITT
JEFFERY S WILLIAMS
CATHERINE AONOLI
CATHERINE L I R A I S O N
WESLEY D FELIX
LISA N E L W Y N D A V I S

A PROFESSIONAL
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ROGER O SANOACK
ROBERT D MOORE
KEVIN M MCOONOUGH
OF COUNSEL

February 18, 1994

•ADMITTED IN CAurO«NIA ONLY

Hand-Delivered
Elizabeth Dolan Winter
Van Cott Bagley,
Cornwall & McCarthy
50 South Main Street
Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, UT 84144
Re:

Stanql v. Ernst

Dear Elizabeth:
Pursuant to my telephone conversation with Roger
Kindley this afternoon, enclosed you will find Mr. Stangl's tax
returns for the years 1988 through 1991. Please be advised that
Mr. Kindley has stipulated that these documents shall be kept
confidential and used only for the purpose of this trial.
I anticipated also providing you this afternoon with
revised versions of the damage exhibits which correct errors and
omissions contained in prior exhibits. Due to my paralegal's
illness and my inability to master some of the spreadsheet
programs, I will not be able to get those to you until sometime
tomorrow morning.

STH:c»*/25962
Enclosures

TabG

LAW

V*
OAVIO C SAustuirr
*• SCOTT W O O O C A M O
xO»mw S JOMMSON
STCPMCN

o

SWINOUC

•oacirr o MC»»«tt
UAM C 'OWVC«
GOM> * WflLUAMS
AM r M ( C H A M
• C N T J G'AUOUC
C SCOTT S A V A Q C
• C N N C T M •» T t A T C S
• A M O U COOK
wOHM A. S N O W
OAViO A

GftCCNWOOO

Atn**jn •
AAIPM
MAM
L. S U U . I V A M
J. KCITM AQAMS

GUT P KAOCSCMC
J O H N A. AMOCMSOM
* * » « O SWAM
G « C G O « r r M SAJMnCK
5 C O T T M MAOCCT
riMOTHV *V • L A C « » U * N
3 0 N A i O C OA4.TOM
GCHAUJ M S U M I V I L L C
MAMtTN M M A M C M
MAWVIN 0 M C L C T
3AVIQ W AMAINGTOM
CASC> «

"CGAUvrr

OOUGLA*

A

C~AJ»* fc. TAYUOH
S * V O M J. • C M C V t M T O
• O 0 C W T W PATMC
JAMCS O G i L S O N
O O U O k A S C TIMGCV
NATHAN W JOMCS
C U X A * C T N O WlNTCW
JON C W A O O O U P *
OAVIO C SLOAM
s c o r r « MATCOA
• A A O I X Y » CAMOOM
OAVIO C A U X N
M C t r S S A O OAVIOSOM
CMAiQ W O A U . O M
M.CNCLC •AAXAMTVMC
TMOMAS m C L A W S O N
OAAHCL * I K C i U r M T
» A l * C t A MAMrTtMSOM
M A T T M t W M QuWUAM
»»CSTON C »CGCM«

JOM C

MICHACL

T

OFFICES

OF

B A G L E Y , C O R N W A L L & M<=
A »KOrCSSlONAL

SUITE
SO

SALT

SOUTH

LAKE

FACSIMILE

UTAM

SUTMCAXAMO

532-3333

DIRECT

VAM COTT

TO

*40*

AcUSOM
*'TC«

WITCH A r A » M S w O « T M
IS*7-«*A?

WASMtMOTOM A O U I X V A W O
OGOCM UTAM m o i

BOX « 5 3 * 0

OlAL

PAMK cmr UTAM » * o « o
<*OM | 4 r ) U I

NUMBCft

•00

WCST

UBCUTT

• C M O . MCVAOA

•••O*

(?o» x n - A A o o
or ci

February 18,

1994

C u r r O A O L. ASMTOM
OAVIO L G i k i X T T C
WCMAMO K. S A O C *
VAMCS » c o w v r r
JOMM CHAWTOOO J*
WtLUAM C f l k U M O m i
. JlMSCN

VIA TELEFAX
Stephen T. Hard
Giauque, Crockett & Bendinger
136 South Main, #500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Stangl v. Ernst Home Center

Dear Steve:
I received your hand-delivered letter dated February
18, 1994 at 4:30 p.m. today. You state that you had anticipated
providing us with "revised versions of the damage exhibits which
correct errors and omissions contained in prior exhibits" this
afternoon. You state that because of the illness of your
paralegal and your difficulty in using spreadsheet programs you
will deliver such documents "sometime tomorrow morning."
You will recall that we served Ernst' s Fifth Set of
Interrogatories on you on December 10, 1993. In these
interrogatories we requested you to supplement your responses to
previous discovery, as you are required to do under the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. We also specifically asked you to
provide us with, among other things, any report that purports to
calculate the alleged damages that you claim Mr. Stangl suffered
as a result of the actions by Ernst; Mr. Stangl' s mitigation of
those damages; how you calculate Mr. Stangl's damages; and all
documents that evidence the means by which you have calculated
damages.
In your January 14, 1994 responses to these discovery
request you objected to providing additional information and
stated that you would "seasonably so inform" Ernst if Mr. Stangl
identified any additional documentary evidence or any additional
expert or lay witnesses in support of his damage theories.
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Stephen T. Hard
February 18, 1994
Page 2
Steve, the trial in this lawsuit is in three days —
beginning on Tuesday after a holiday weekend. As I expressed in
my January 14, 1994 letter "seasonably so inform[ing]M Ernst of
additional evidence and witnesses would have been in response to
our requests served on December 10, 1994.
Because you did not provide us with information about
any revisions you planned with regard to your damage analysis or
exhibits, and because we have relied on your statement to us that
you had produced to us all information in support of Mr. Stangl' s
claims, we will oppose any effort by you to introduce at trial
any documents, witnesses, or experts that we do not have or have
not deposed.
If you have any questions, please call.
Very truly yours,

Elizabeth Dolan Winter
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*AOMlTTCO IN CALIFORNIA ON4.Y

VIA HAND DELIVERY

Elizabeth Dolan Winter, Esq.
VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy
50 South Main, Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Re: Stanql v. Ernst Home Center
Dear Elizabeth:
The purpose of this letter is to readily identify for
you the corrections which have been made to the prior trial
exhibits. These corrections are included in the new exhibits
which we faxed to you today and which are enclosed herewith. All
references to document numbers, unless otherwise noted are to the
"SS" series. The changes are as follows:
1. To the Gibson/GGGiant On-site improvement costs, a
detailed examination revealed that checks for insurance payments
(category 40) totalling $2,079 as reflected in document control
nos. SS00000 534-36 were not included. Those have now been
added.
We have also added to the Gibson/GGGiant costs the
amount of $160.00 which is shown on document control number 496,
but which was not included in category 110 of the Job Cost
Report.
These changes required a redrafting of the summary
sheet for the job costs for this project.
2. With respect to the Firestone store, document # 565
shows that $210 was not included in the job cost report, which
has now been added to category 120 and to the summary sheet.
3. With respect to the North Shops, category 400 is
being increased by $375 which represents the check to R.L. Gines
which we have been able to determine was expended for the North

Elizabeth Dolan Winter, Esq,
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Shops. Accordingly, line item no. 14 on Subpart "A" to trial
exhibit 65 has been deleted and that amount is now included in
the North Shop costs, the summary sheet for those costs and
Exhibit 65, Subpart "A", line 24.
4. With respect to Jiffy Lube, we have changed
category 30 from $899.25 to $2,840 because document # 872 shows
that the check was not properly coded, and we have determined
through records from West Jordan that the entire $2,588 on
document # 872 was for Jiffy Lube. Plaintiff's Exhibit 66E
is the backup for this specific cost which is being transmitted
herewith.
We have attempted to carry-over these changes to
wherever the numbers are included in other exhibits which have
been provided to you.
5. With respect to Exhibit 65, Subpart M B", we have
changed slightly the methodology for the calculation of this
number. More particularly, we have now disclosed to you on what
we have identified as Ex. 65, Subpart "G", how we arrived at the
value for the Firestone and Independent Testing Land. This
change was made to provide a consistent methodology throughout
the exhibits, whereas before there had been different valuation
methods.
6. Our prior exhibit 65, subpart "D" has been changed
to provide the same methodology as discussed in paragraph 5
above, and we have described the rent as being "annual" rent.
7. Our prior exhibit 65 had a page entitled MIET &
Firestone Interest Calculation." We have now included that same
information in what we now identify as ex. 65- Subpart "E". To
aid your and the court's understanding, we have also made
reference to the source material from which those figures came.
8. Our prior exhibit 65 had a page entitled
"Allocation of Loan Reduction". We have simply included this
same information in the document identified as Ex.65-- Subpart
"F".
Again, we have attempted to carry-forward this new
information in whatever exhibits refer back to them.
9. To the new Exhibit 65, Subpart "A", and its
different versions, we have added a new line which should be
identified as line 1A. This represents interest payments which
were made by Mr. Stangl to the Brockbanks on the $250,000 note
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which he gave them when he purchased the property in August,
1988. The copies of the checks are compiled in a new Exhibit 66C
which is being transmitted herewith.
10. To the new Exhibit 65, Subpart M A M , and its
different versions, we have changed the number for line 8 to
state correctly the amount of taxes paid as revealed in the
backup documentation.
11. To the new Exhibit 65, Subpart "A", and its
different versions, we have changed line 16 to properly reflect
the actual attorney's fees paid, as revealed in prior information
provided to you. Roger has agreed to stipulate to the admission
of the billing records for Kimball, Parr which we will identify
as Exhibit 66D.
As you can see, these changes are very minor, properly
reflect expenses which were incurred in relation to the
acquisition and/or development of the subject property, and
should not be the subject of any claim of prejudice, surprise or
the like. Further, much of this could have been resolved earlier
if your firm or Roger had taken up the court's request and our
numerous repeated requests to stipulate to the admission of Mr.
Stangl's business records. The unwillingness to do so required
us to do a detailed analysis of each record to see how it related
to the job cost reports and the previous exhibits, all of which
revealed the errors which have been corrected with the new
exhibits. Given the significant volume of pages, the task was
difficult and time-consuming.
As you requested, I am hand-delivering to you hard
copies of the new exhibits with this letter. In printing these
documents previously, I cut-off a portion of Exhibit 65 which
carried over the statement re loss of banking relationship which
was in the prior Ex. 65. I also cut-off a portion of Ex. 65,
subpart "A" (before and after 9/30) which included additional
date references. I apologize.
If you have any further questions, please feel free to
contact me.
,
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